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Neutrality of the Equal Protection Clause
by K.G.

JAN PILLAI*

I. Introduction
The brief interlude of effective race-wide remedies within Equal
Protection jurisprudence is almost over. The Supreme Court has decisively abandoned the anticaste principle1 of the Equal Protection
Clause in favor of the colorblind principle.2 Our pluralistic society,
which conscientiously strives to navigate the terrain of racial and gender inequality, now depends exclusively on the safe and successful

auto-piloting of a colorblind constitution. Encoded in the principle of
colorblindness is the concept of neutrality that mandates absolute government impartiality toward individuals and groups without regard to
their race, color, ethnicity, gender or disabilities. However, neutrality
still remains an amorphous concept in equal protection jurisprudence.
The Court's unwillingness or inability to clearly articulate, and faith* Professor of Law, Temple University. The author is grateful to Professors Cass R.
Sunstein, Randall L. Kennedy, Mark Rabdert, and Robert J. Reinstein, Dean of the James
E. Beasley School of Law at Temple University, for reading and commenting on the final
draft of this article. My special thanks to my secretary Shirley Hall, John Necci of the
Temple Law Library, and to my research assistant, Jessica Dellavalla.
1. See Cass Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle,92 MicH. L. Rnv. 2410 (1994) (arguing
that the most sensible reading of the Equal Protection Clause would prohibit only governmental actions that subjugate or subordinate racial groups, and not remedial actions that
help groups subjected to discrimination and subordination). Professor Laurence Tribe
made a similar argument in his constitutional law treatise. TRmE, AmERiCAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-21 (2d ed. 1988). The anticaste principle has been recognized by the
Supreme Court on several occasions. See, e.g., Strauder v. Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307
(1880) (the pervading purpose of the Civil War Amendments was to outlaw discrimination
against a once-enslaved race); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,243 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("There is no moral or constitutional equivalence between a policy
that is designed to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate racial
subordination.").
2. The colorblindness principle is also known as the anti-discrimination principle.
The principle is typically stated by Chief Justice Rehnquist as: "Racial classifications are
antithetical to the Fourteenth Amendment whose 'central purpose' [was] 'to eliminate racial discrimination emanating from official sources in the States."' Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S.
899, 907 (1996), quoted in McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964). For a recent
reference to the distinction between colorblindness and racial subordination, see Kathleen
M. Sullivan, The Future of Affinnative Action: After Affirmative Action, 59 Omo ST. L.J.
1039, 1040 (1998).
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fully adhere to, the concept of neutrality has rendered the realization
of the laudable ideal of a colorblind constitution problematic if not
impossible.
In several government arenas where race-wide remedial measures were once considered both necessary and appropriate, the colorblind principle has created profound and harmful inroads. For
example, the Supreme Court has systematically outlawed race-based

affirmative action programs in the public arena such as public contracting,3 government employment,4 and state-funded educational institutions,5 except in the most unlikely instances where the use of
racial criteria could be justified under strict scrutiny,6 have all been
victims of the Court's colorblind policy interpretations. Likewise, the

colorblindness principle permits many school districts to sidestep the
burden of complying with court-ordered desegregation plans.
In the case of school desegregation, the Supreme Court allows
districts to extricate themselves from desegregation orders in three
3. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (invalidating, under
strict scrutiny, minority contract set-asides by the city of Richmond); Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 200 (holding a race-conscious affirmative action program in public contracting established by a federal statute unconstitutional, despite the power of Congress to
enforce the Fourtheenth Amendment under § 5 of the Equal Protection Clause).
4. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (invalidating a collectively
bargained preference to minority teachers in the event of layoff); Taxman v. Board of
Educ. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2506
(1997), cerL denied, 521 U.S. 1117 (invalidating the School Board's use of race-conscious
criteria to choose which of two equally qualified tenured teachers to terminate, pursuant to
its affirmative action plan-the circuit court applied strict scrutiny as required by the
Supreme Court). In Taxman, the case was settled and the parties submitted a joint motion
to the U.S. Supreme Court seeking dismissal of the case.
5. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Justice Powell's
controlling opinion in the case recognized consideration of race as a plus factor in evaluating candidates for admission to the extent it served the university's educational goal of
achieving diversity. However, after the strict scrutiny standard gained a strong foothold in
the Court's equal protection jurisprudence, lower federal courts have rejected diversity as
a rationale for race-based decisions of educational institutions. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78
F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996). See also Podberesky v. Kirwan,
956 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1992) (striking down a University of Maryland scholarship made
available only to African American candidates for admission).
6. In City of Richmond, for the first time, a majority of the Supreme Court adopted
the strict scrutiny standard for evaluating racial classifications. Strict scrutiny requires the
government to demonstrate that a race-based program is narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling governmental interest. Professor Gerald Gunther characterized strict scrutiny
as "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact." Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. Rnv. 1, 8
(1972). Justice O'Connor tried to "dispel the notion" that strict scrutiny is fatal in her
Adarand opinion. See Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 237. Accord Adarand, 515 U.S.
at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
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circumstances. School districts may relieve themselves of desegregation mandates by showing a good faith effort "to the extent practicable ' 7 to eliminate past discrimination, by showing that the causal link

between the past de jure segregation and its vestiges has become attenuated, 8 or by showing that remedial plans have been in place too
long to justify continued judicial intervention into autonomous decisionmaking by local school authorities. 9
The colorblindness principle has also led the Court to invalidate a

series of state legislative redistricting plans designed to increase minority representation in the national legislature. 10 The Court has
found constitutional malady in several noncompact," redistricting
plans because they were either "unexplainable in terms other than
race"'12 or because the Court found that "race was the predominant
factor motivating the drawing" of those districts.' 3
7. Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991) (terminating a desegregation decree
after finding compliance in good faith since the decree was entered and the vestiges of past
discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practicable). Accord Missouri v. Jenkins,
515 U.S. 70 (1995).
8. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 496 (1992) (holding that a federal district court
could relinquish supervision and control of school districts in incremental stages before full
desegregation compliance was achieved, as the de jure violation became more remote.
Further, demographic changes intervened in shaping the racial composition of the student
population and the causal link between current conditions and past violations had become
"more attenuated," especially since the school district had "demonstrated its good faith").
9. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 102 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing
Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992)) (admonishing the district court to bear in mind
that its end purpose is not only to remedy the violation "to the extent practicable," but also
"to restore state and local authorities to the control of a school system that is operating in
compliance with the Constitution").
10. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1995); Bush v.
Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1995); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
11. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 637 (invalidating North Carolina's reapportionment scheme
on the ground that it arbitrarily created legislative district with majority black voters
"'without regard to any other considerations, such as compactness, continguousness, geophraphical boundaries, or political subdivision' with the purpose 'to create Congressional
Districts along racial lines').
12. Id. at 644 (quoting Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (accepting the argument of challengers to a redistricting plan that
the legislation was so bizarre on its face that it was "unexplainable on grounds other than
race"). Accord Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 972 (1996) (finding that the "contours of Congressional District 30 are unexplainable in terms other than race").
13. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 917 (1995) (invalidating a Georgia redistricting
plan on the ground that race was the "predominant, overriding factor" motivating the
drawing of the district, even though other traditional race-neutral districting principles
were also influencing the redistricting, id. at 921). Accord Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74,
119 (1997) (approving the district court's remedial redistricting plan which contained one
black majority district in Georgia, instead of the two black majority districts proposed in
the state legislature's redistricting plan. Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter,
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While making these momentous decisions, the Court was mindful
of the current state of racial discrimination and inequality in Ameri-

can society. Even while stretching the colorblind doctrine to require
race-specific remedial programs established by Congress' 4 to undergo
strict judicial scrutiny,' 5 the Court acknowledged that "[t]he unhappy
persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this country is an unfortunate
reality .... "1 6 Similarly, although the Court invalidated a minority
contract set aside by the city of Richmond-a city with a majority
black population, in which its black entrepreneurs received less than
3% of city contracting dollars-the Court also had "no doubt that the
sorry history of both private and public discrimination in this country
has contributed to a lack of opportunities for black entrepreneurs.""
After making these factual observations in these and other social contexts,18 the Court made clear that it was not oblivious to longstanding
and persistent racial discrimination. The Court, however, then proceeded to alert all levels of government to abandon race-referenced
remedies that are at odds with a colorblind constitution 9 and mandated the creation of legally acceptable alternatives to combat the
problems of racial biases and imbalances."
and Ginsburg, dissented, stating that the majority, "by focusing upon what it considered to
be unreasonably pervasive positive use of race as a redistricting factor, has created a legal
doctrine that will unreasonably restrict legislators' use of race, even for the most benign, or
antidiscriminatory purposes.").
14. Congress has the authority to establish such programs by virtue of its enforcement
power under the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV § 5.
15. See K.G. Jan Pillai, Phantom of the Strict Scrutiny, 31 NEw ENG. L. REv. 397
(1997).
16. Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 237.
17. Croson, 488 U.S. at 499. The city of Richmond established a 30% contract set
aside for minorities. See id. at 477. The Court found that the government failed to demonstrate a compelling interest and that the program was not narrowly targeted to remedy the
alleged discrimination in the contracting business. See id at 496.
18. See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 112-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The unfortunate fact
of racial imbalance and bias in our society, however pervasive or invidious, does not admit
of judicial intervention absent a constitutional violation." In the case, the Court repudiated a court-ordered desegregation plan on the ground that the district court was not able
to "justify its transgression" in designing the plan to create "desegregation attractiveness"
so as to make the segregated schools attractive to students from suburbs).
19. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 492 (stating that state or local subdivision has the authority
to eradicate the effects of discrimination, but the authority must be exercised "within the
constrainsts of §1 of the Fourteenth Amendment").
20. See id at 494 ("States and their local subdivisions have many legislative weapons
at their disposal both to punish and prevent discrimination and to remove arbitrary barriers to minority advancement [without resorting to racial classifications].").
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Realizing the Supreme Court's colorblind jurisprudence has "alter[ed] the playing field [of race-specific remedies] in some important

respects,"2 1 the nation's policymakers have begun their search for
race-neutral alternatives. Some have abandoned race-specific remedies entirely and others have scaled them down or made operational
changes to make the remedies less objectionable. Among the institutions that have ended race-based programs are the Boston School District, the University of Washington and the University of Texas. The
Boston School Committee voted to end the city's 25-year-old court
ordered busing integration program. 22 According to the superintendent of Boston schools, the immediate reason for ending the program
was the awareness of "the tenor of court decisions around the land,

with respect to use of race in student assignment plans." 23
Haunted by a reverse discrimination class-action lawsuit and the
passage of an anti-affirmative action statewide referendum in 1998,
the University of Washington likewise announced that the school was
"regretfully suspending its 30-year practice of race-conscious admissions." 24 Although the decision will considerably reduce the percentage of minority students who constitute about 8% of the total student
population, the University has not devised a more equitable substitute

plan .25
21. Adarand Contructors, 505 U.S. at 237 (majority opinion of Justice O'Connor).
22. See Carey Goldberg, Busing's Day Ends: Boston Drops Race in Pupil Placement,
N.Y. Tnms, July 15, 1999, at Al, A14 (the Boston School Committee voted 5 to 2 to end
race-based busing and to return to the system of neighborhood schools).
23. Id. (quoting superintendent Thomas W. Payzant). The Committee voted "under
pressure" from a pending lawsuit that challenged the busing program as racially discriminatory against white children. In 1998, the federal courts struck down the race-based admission policy of the prestigious Boston Latin School. In a news conference the mayor of
Boston stated:
[W]e are united in our belief that a lengthy court battle over assignment policies
would only further distract us from our most important challenge: raising the
level of excellence for every student and every school, all 129 schools in Boston.
Id.at A14. It should be noted that since the implementation of the busing plan, "white
flight" to the suburbs has reduced the percentage of white students in Boston public
schools from 52% in 1974 to 16% in 1999. The current student population is comprised of
49% black, 26% Hispanic, 9% Asian and 16% white students. Some predict that the end
of race-based busing would lead to "resegregation." Id.
24. Ethan Bronner, U. of Washington Will End Race-Conscious Admissions, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 7, 1998, at A12.
25. The University's decision would have a serious impact on the American Indians of
the state of Washington. The University's student undergraduate population, prior to the
suspension, was comprised of 2.8% black, 4% Hispanic and 1.5% American Indian students. The University only promised that it was "determined to do everything... within
the law to maintain diversity of the student body." Id.
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Unlike Washington State, Texas-prevented by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals from continuing race-conscious admission practices
at the Texas University School of Law26 -adopted a law that requires
each of the state's public undergraduate institutions to admit all applicants with a grade point average in the top ten percent of their high
school graduating class.2 7 Texas lawmakers hope that its "ten percent
solution" will reverse the dramatic decline in minority enrollment that
the state's colleges and universities experienced in the wake of the
circuit court decision.2 8 Experienced academics William Bowen and
Derek Bok predict that such class-based programs "will not have appreciable effects on racial diversity (and could also be very costly and
harmful to academic standards, depending on how they are implemented)."2 9 Racial diversity is arguably an acceptable goal for a university to pursue. 0 Seemingly, a university would want to pursue that
goal in the most efficient manner possible. Texas' race-neutral policy
happens to be the least efficient means of achieving that goal.3 1 Moreover, skeptics persuasively argue that class-based affirmative action
predominantly fails in achieving the core objective of race-conscious
affirmative action: remedying the lingering effects of past and present
racial discrimination.3 2
26. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert denied, 518 U.S. 1033
(1996). The Hopwood decision has been criticized as incompatible with the Supreme
Court's decision in Regents of the Univeristy of Californiav. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), in
which the controlling opinion of Justice Powell permitted use of race as a "plus" factor in
admissions for the purpose of promoting diversity. The Hopwood court maintained that
Justice Powell's solitary opinion favoring diversity never commanded a majority of the
Supreme Court. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944. For a critique of Hopwood, see Lackland
H. Bloom, Jr., Hopwood, Bakke and the Futureof the Diversity Justification,29 TEx. TECH.
L. R~v. 1, 72 (1998) (stating that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke "provided a wise and
constitutional means of reconciling the quest for a colorblind society with the reality of a
race-conscious one .... As such Hopwood was wrong to reject it.").
27. See TEx. EDuc. CODE ANN.§ 51.803 (West Supp. 1999).
28. See The Diversity Project in Texas, N.Y. TsMEs, Nov. 27, 1999, at A4.
29. WILLA G. BowEN & DEREK BOK, Tim SHAPE OF THE RrVER: LONG TERM
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERsrTY ADMIsSIoNS 288
(1998).
30. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (opinion of Justice Powell stating that a university has a
First Amendment right to pursue the goal of diversity).
31. See Sullivan, supra note 2, at 1054 (stating that "[ilt would seem perverse to require, as a matter of constitutional law, that a permissible goal be sought by the least
efficient alternative means").
32. See Deborah C. Malamud, Assessing Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 452, 464-71 (1997); K. ANTHONY APPis & AMY GuTMANN, COLOR CoNsCIoUs:
THE PoLmcAL MoiuJirAr OF RACE 138-42 (1996). One of the skeptics, however, saw a
"silver lining in the effort to find alternatives" by the state of Texas, even though the rejection of the traditional affirmative action is very troubling in many ways. David Orentlicher, Affirmative Action and Texas' Ten Percent Solution: Improving Diversity and
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The Clinton Administration stands firmly in its -belief that raceneutral means are an inadequate substitute for race-specific affirmative action plans. After a comprehensive review of all existing racebased federal programs,"3 President Clinton concluded that "affirmative action remains a useful tool for widening economic and educational opportunity"' and that "evidence suggests, indeed, screams
that [the] day [to retire affirmative action] has not come."3" In 1995,
the President proposed a two-prong strategy to see that the law delivers "fairness for everyone" exactly as "the law does require."3 6 First,
he embraced a "Mend it, but don't end it" slogan, advocating a
streamlining rather than a dismantling of race-based affirmative action
programs. 7 Second, the President renewed his Administration's commitment "to vigorous, effective enforcement of laws prohibiting
discrimination."3 "

President Clinton is more knowledgeable about the nation's history of race discrimination and its disabling effects on minorities than
many of his modem predecessors.3 9 The President's support for afQuality, 74 NoTRE- DAMm L. REv. 181, 210 (1998) (arguing that the ten percent solution
may have the potential to improve public school education and discourage the affluent
from sending their children to the best or more expensive private schools).
33. See Affirmative Action Review: Report to the President (visited Feb. 26, 2000)
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/OP/html/aa/aa-index.html>. The review was triggered by the Supreme Court decision in Adarand Constructors,Inc. v. Pena,515 U.S. 200
(1995), that held federal race-conscious programs would be subject to strict scrutiny. The
review was directed by George Stephanopoulos, Senior Advisor to the President for Policy
and Strategy.
34. Remarks of President Clinton at the National Archives and Records Administration, 2 Pun. PAPERS 1106 (July 19, 1995) [hereinafter Remarks of President Clinton].
35. Id. at 1113.
36. Memorandum on Affirmative Actions for Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies, 2 PuB. PAIERS 1114 (July 19, 1995) [hereinafter Memorandum on Affirmative
Action].
37. Remarks of PresidentClinton, supra note 34, at 1113. The President issued a directive to the agencies and department to eliminate or modify any programs that use race,
ethnicity or gender as a consideration, if the policy falls into the following "policy principles": a) creates a quota; (b) creates preferences for unqualified individuals; (c) creates
reverse discrimination; or (d) continues even after its equal opportunity purposes have
been achieved. See Memorandum on Affirmative Action, supra note 36, at 1114.
38. Remarks of PresidentClinton,supra note 34, at 1114. Note also that the President
sought $695 million for civil rights enforcement in his budget request for 2001, an increase
of 13 percent over the budget for the year 2000. See Clinton Seeks Increase in Civil Rights
Budget, N.Y. Tmms, Jan. 16, 2000, at A26.
39. See generallyPRESIDENT BELL CLINTON, BETWEEN HOPE AND HISTORY: MEETING
AMERICA'S CHALLENGES FOR THE 21sT CENTRtY (1996). The President's commitment to
racial and gender equality is evident from the fact that he has "appointed more women and

minorities to the Federal bench than [his last three] predecessors combined." 1 Pun. PAPERS 295 (March 3, 1995).
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firmative action is a natural outgrowth of his convictions. His policy
initiatives on race, such as the creation of the President's Advisory
Board on Race,4" are testaments to his commitment to racial equality.
An affirmative action make-over, however, is not likely to pacify the
adherents of colorblind jurisprudence within the federal judiciary.
Since the Adarand decision, the Clinton Administration has lost every
case in which it has sought the Supreme Court's imprimatur of raceconscious programs.4 1 According to the Court, the dispensing of benefits or imposing of burdens by the government based on considerations of race is incompatible with the Equal Protection Clause and its
"central mandate" which "is racial neutrality in governmental decisionmaking."'4 The Clinton Administration should, therefore, concentrate its efforts on the second prong of its strategy and implement
the vigorous and effective enforcement of the nation's anti-discrimination laws.
Opponents of race-based affirmative action have long maintained
that the best and most constitutional means of achieving racial equality is effective and impartial enforcement of anti-discrimination laws.
To drive home their point, some have even advocated that racial discrimination in violation of anti-discrimination law should be subjected
to both civil and criminal penalties.4 3 There is much disagreement
concerning the appropriate means for eradicating racial discrimination, but there is little disagreement surrounding racism's pervasive
existence and its adverse effects on societal well-being. The President's Advisory Board on Race, after its year long, high profile investigation, found that at the end of the 20th Century "[t]he color of
40. See Exec. Order No. 13,050, 62 Fed. Reg. 32,987 (1997).
41. The Administration unsuccessfully sought approval of redistricting legislation in
Georgia, Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995), in Texas, Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996),

and in North Carolina, Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996). As a result of the Supreme
Court's disapproval of race-based redistricting, Georgia reduced the number of black-majority districts from 3 to 1. See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997). North Carolina
reduced the population of the disapproved district from a majority-black district to 47 percent black district. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999).
The Supreme Court also rejected the Administration's request to review the Fifth Circuit decision in Hopwood v. Texas, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996) and the Ninth Circuit decision in
Coalition for Economic Equality v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997).

42. Miller, 515 U.S. at 904 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 191-192; and Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
43. See Shelby Steele, Affirmative Action Must Go, N.Y. Tnzms, March 1, 1995, at A19.
"To my mind there is only one way to moral authority for those of us who want affirmative
action done away with: to ask that discrimination by race, gender or ethnicity be a criminal
offense, not just civil. If someone can go to jail for stealing my car stereo, he ought to do
considerably more time for stifling my livelihood and well-being by discriminating against
me. This means there will be many trials and lawsuits, so be it." Id.
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one's skin continues to affect an individual's opportunities to receive a
good education, acquire the skills to get and maintain a good job, have
44
access to equal health care, and receive equal justice under the law."
In our multi-racial democracy, remedying such a regrettable condition
must be prioritized. If race-based affirmative action is constitutionally
suspect, and class-based alternatives are off-target and inadequate,
then the only available legal means to racial equality is resolute and
impartial enforcement of anti-discrimination laws.
Thus, the question thrust to the forefront of our remedial jurisprudence is whether, and how optimally, the law empowers the victims of racial discrimination to fend for themselves through normal
recourse of our judicial system. The prevailing equal protection jurisprudence is, in many respects, discriminator-friendly. Substantively,
the only misconduct actionable under the Equal Protection Clause is
intentional discrimination 4 5-a limitation that exonerates the increasingly more complex and subtle forms of contemporary discrimination.4 6 Procedurally, the Supreme Court has made the task of proving

intentional discrimination-in the absence of some so-called "smoking gun" evidence-extremely difficult.4 7 The most pernicious proce44. ONE AMERICA IN T=E 21sr CENTURY: FORGING A NEW FUTURE, Tim PRsiENT's
INrniATVE ON RACE: THm ADVISORY BoARD's REPORT To THE PRESmENT 35 (U.S.
Gov't Printing Office 1998).
45. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,239-42 (1976); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,
413 U.S. 189, 208-09 (1973) (stating that intent to segregate is necessary to establish liability for school segregation); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992) (racial imbalance in
schools could be remedied only if the school engaged in de jure segregation).
46. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment Transformation and
Legitimation in AntidiscriminationLaw, 101 HARv. L. Rv. 1331, 1384 (1988) (stating "the
belief that racial exclusion is illegitimate only where the 'White Only' signs are explicit...
makes it difficult" to tackle problems of underlying racism in society); Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial DiscriminationThrough AntidiscriminationLaw: A CriticalReview of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MNN. L. REv. 1049, 1055 (1978) (arguing that the
intent requirement permits the discriminator to escape liability just by "showing that the
action was taken for a good reason, or for no reason at all"); see also Charles R. Lawrence
III, The Id, the Ego, and EqualProtection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN.
L. REv. 317 (1987) (arguing that racism, often unintentional and even unconscious, cannot
be comprehended by the intent requirement).
47. See, e.g., the procedural rules established by the Supreme Court for proving intentional discrimination in the context of employment. More than a quarter century ago, the
Supreme Court in a landmark case, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973), unanimously prescribed a formulaic way to evaluate evidence of intentional discrimination. The McDonnell Douglas framework was summarized by the court in Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981) as follows:
First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence a
prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff successfully proves the
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for employee's rejection. Third, should the defendant
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dural barrier to effective enforcement in the post-affirmative action
era is the rule of Washington v. Davis48 which ordains that, absent
proof of invidious purpose or intent, a facially neutral law or government practice would not violate the equal protection principle even if

it imposed disproportionate burdens on racial minorities. This pernicious limiting rule shelters systemic racial discrimination from judicial
cognizance and remediation at the initiative of individual victims.
This Article is not intended to take issue with the enforcement-handicapping intent rule as such, even though the rule's corrosive impact on equality jurisprudence is interspersedly discussed. The

sole focus of the Article, rather, is the dispositive role that the rule of
Washington v. Davis assigns to facial neutrality and the rule's stifling
effect on meaningful judicial review. The basic premise of the Article

is that if the "central mandate" of the colorblind Equal Protection
Clause is "racial neutrality in governmental decisionmaking,"4 9 the
burden of establishing neutrality should always remain with the government. A law which disproportionately disadvantages a racial minority should be deemed prima facie unneutral toward the
disadvantaged minority and should be treated as such unless the government proves otherwise. Instead of requiring the government to
prove the neutrality of the racially disadvantaging law, the Davis rule
improperly saddles the members of the disadvantaged minority with
the unwarranted burden of proving the government's discriminatory
intent. In the case of racially disadvantageous laws, the real issue is
not whether the law purposefully discriminates, rather it is whether
carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by preponderance of evidence that the legitimate reason offered by the defendant were not
its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.
In a 5 to 4 decision, the Supreme Court in St Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502

(1993), changed the McDonnellDouglas framework. The majority opinion written by Justice Scalia held that the defendant, faced with a prima facie case of discrimination, has only
the "burden of production," a burden "to come forward with some response." Id. at 509.
If the defendant satisfies this burden, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff who must
persuade the trier of fact "that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff." Id. at 507. Plaintiff cannot succeed simply by proving that the employer's proffered
reason is pretextual or false. The dissenters, in an opinion by Justice Souter, complained
that the majority "destroyed a framework carefully crafted in precedents" and made it
tremendously difficult for a victim of discrimination lacking direct evidence to prove his/
her case. Id. at 525 (Souter, J., joined by Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens,
dissenting).
48. 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). See also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977) (stating that "[o]ur decision [in Washington
v. Davis] made it clear that official action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it
results in a racially disproportionate impact").
49. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
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the law is truly neutral. A law can be non-neutral without being purposefully discriminatory and non-neutrality-without more-can be
at odds with the colorblind Equal Protection Clause. Therefore, the
core issue in judicial review of a law that disproportionately disadvantages racial minorities is its neutrality and not the evil intent or purpose of the lawmakers. The concept of neutrality is so elusive, and at
times even ephemeral, that it cannot be taken for granted from the
facial appearance of the law.
Our analysis of the Supreme Court's neutrality jurisprudence begins with a discussion of the Davis rule's requirement of purposeful
discrimination and the rule's bypasses of the neutrality inquiry into
race disadvantaging laws. This segment also makes a comparison between Davis rule neutrality and the universal concept of neutrality
formulated by the law of nations. In order to illustrate the danger of
leaving the concept of neutrality in the present state of doctrinal indeterminacy, Part I analyzes federal court litigation concerning California Proposition 209. Using racial profiling in New Jersey as an
example of discriminatory impact, Part IV further demonstrates that
even blatant discriminatory enforcement practices could be easily hidden behind facial neutrality. This section further demonstrates that
piercing the neutrality veil with proof of purposeful discrimination is a
nearly impossible task. Part V examines the Supreme Court's neutrality inquiry in First Amendment cases and proposes that the Court
should at least conduct the same kind of inquiry into facial neutrality
in Equal Protection cases. The concluding section urges the Supreme
Court to take adventurous initiatives to define neutrality in terms of
verifiable impartiality, not only to provide justice to racial minorities
in the post-affirmative action era but also to rid the emerging colorblind equal protection jurisprudence of suspicions of judicial
partiality.
H.

The Damage Free Impact

A. The Davis Trilogy
From the perspective of racial minorities, the most serious impediment to effective enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause is the
rule of Washington v. Davis. 0 Established during the heyday of affirmative action,' the rule requires a showing of "discriminatory pur50. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
51. See Michel Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme
Court Rhetoric, 86 GEo. L.. 279, 339 (1997) ("The Court's incongruous approach to dis-
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pose" to invalidate "a law, neutral on its face and serving ends
otherwise within the power of government to pursue," even if the law
produces adverse disproportionate impact on racial minorities. 52 The
rule was successively reaffirmed in two other cases. In Village of Ar-

lington Heights v. M.H.D. Corp.,53 the Court held the racially discriminatory effect of the village's zoning decision would be "without

independent constitutional significance" unless there was a showing
that "discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor" in the decision.5 4 The Court also expressed its willingness to find an equal protection violation in the rare situation in which "a clear pattern,
unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of
the state action even when the governing legislation appears neutral
'55
on its face."

crimination is perhaps best explained by the fact that its doctrine came of age in the 1970's,
in the shadow of affirmative action.").
52. Id. at 279. In Davis, unsuccessful black candidates challenged the validity of a
written verbal ability test used by the D.C. Police Department to screen their recruits on
the ground that the test had a "highly discriminatory impact in screening out black candidates" and that the test bore no relationship to on-the-job performance of recruits. Davis
v. Washington, 348 F. Supp. 15, 16 (D.D.C. 1972). The failure rate of black candidates who
took the test over a 3 year period was more than four times as high as the failure rate of
whites (5.7% to 13%). Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 958-59 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Plaintiffs did not claim "intentional discrimination or purposeful discriminatory acts." Davis v.
Washington, 348 F. Supp. 15, 16 (D.D.C. 1972). The District Court, upholding the test,
stated that the Department made "a vigorous, systematic, and persistent affirmative effort
to enroll black policemen." Id. at 17. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the "racially
disproportionate impact" cast a heavy burden on the Department to prove the test was
actually related to job performance. Id. at 15. The Court relied on Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), a Title VII case in which the Supreme Court recognized a disparate impact cause of action under Title VII holding that "[i]f an employment practice which
operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited." Id. at 431.
53. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). The case involved a challenge to the village's zoning decision
that prevented construction of low-cost housing on the ground that the decision had a
disproportionate impact on racial minorities. The village claimed its decision was motivated by a desire to "protect property values and the integrity of the village's zoning plan."
Id at 259. The Supreme Court held that "[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 265. The Court
suggested that the "purpose" can be proven by a "sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial
and direct evidence of intent as may be available," such as historical background, departure from normal procedures, and legislative and administrative history. Id. at 266.
54. Id. at 270-71.
55. Id. at 266. The Court was compelled to carve out the exception to accommodate a
few prior cases that held historic significance. The Court cited Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268
(1939); and Gomililion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
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Nevertheless, the Court seemed to tighten the Davis rule further

when it held in PersonnelAdministrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney56
that facially neutral laws that produce even the most severe forms of
discriminatory impact were made impervious to judicial review without proof of purposeful discrimination. In Feeney, a facially neutral
law providing an absolute preference to veterans for state civil service
jobs was challenged as violative of the Equal Protection Clause solely
on the basis of the law's disproportionate exclusionary impact on women's employment opportunities. Although evidence revealed the
stark reality that over ninety-eight percent of the state's veterans were
men57 and that the severe underrepresentation of women in the veterans population was the direct result of the long standing exclusionary
practices of the Armed Services,5 8 the Court found the law valid absent a showing of "gender-based discriminatory purpose."5 9 Of
course, it would be utterly unreasonable for anyone to argue that veterans' preference designed to reward service and sacrifice has a gender-based discriminatory purpose. It would not be unreasonable to
suggest the legislature retained knowledge or foresight concerning the
inevitable adverse consequences of the seemingly neutral preference
system. The Court ruled discriminatory purpose required "more than
intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences."60 A showing of discriminatory purpose requires a showing that the legislature
adopted a preference law "at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in
spite of,', its adverse effect" on women. 6 ' The Court also made clear
that it was not unduly concerned about the prospect of perpetuating
the disproportionate impact of facially neutral laws or about the feasibility of achieving the law's neutral ends by less discriminatory
means.

62

56. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
57. See id. at 271 ("The impact of the veterans' preference law upon the public employment opportunities of women has thus been severe.").
58. The Court stated that "[tihe enlistment policies of the Armed Services may well
have discriminated on the basis of sex .... But the history of discrimination against women in the military is not on trial in this case." Id. at 278.
59. IM at 280.
60. Id. at 279.
61. The Court recited the holding in the Arlington Heights case stating that it upheld a
zoning board decision implementing a neutral zoning policy regardless of its effect "that
tended to perpetuate racially segregated housing pattern." Id. at 273.
62. In his dissent, Justice Marshall argued that the state could have accomplished its
legislative goal by a streamlined preference for veterans thereby reducing its disastrous
impact on women. See id. at 285 (Marshall, J., joined by Justice Brennan, dissenting). The
majority stated: "The calculus of effects, the manner in which a particular law reverberates
in a society, is a legislative and not a judicial responsibility." Id. at 272.
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Unquestionably, the Davis trilogy has rendered the Equal Protec-

tion Clause impact-blind. If a law is facially neutral, its disproportionate impact on racial minorities (or women) is constitutionally
irrelevant, regardless of the foreseeability and severity of the impact

or its convincing potential to perpetuate racially discriminatory patterns of behavior. Davis marks the first time the Supreme Court prescribed purposeful discrimination as the sole antidote to the disparate

racial impact of a facially neutral law63 and, therefore, calls into question the precedents relied upon by the Supreme Court.

The Davis rule rests squarely on the judicial apprehension that a
contrary rule demanding compelling justification for impact-producing neutral laws "would be far-reaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare,
public service, regulatory and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the more affluent white."'6 The Court presented no empirical evidence to support
the feared parade of horribles.65 Of course, had the Court scanned

the entire history of the Equal Protection Clause, spanning over a century, the Court would not have found any evidence of racial minorities
making massive Equal Protection-based attacks on the nation's revenue and regulatory laws. Furthermore, in the past, the Court has emphatically stated that general statutes serving neutral ends are not by

any means immune from the limitations created by constitutionally
guaranteed individual rights and privileges. 6
63. For a discussion of prior case law, see Making the Violation Fit the Remedy: The
Intent Standard and Equal Protection Law, 92 YALE LJ.328 (1982).
64. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976).
65. The Court quoted three theoreticians: Frank I. Goodman, De Facto School Segregatioin A Constitutionaland EmpiricalAnalysis, 60 CAi. L. REv.275, 300 (1972); William
Silverman, Equal Protection, Economic Legislation, and Racial Discrimination,25 VAND.
L. Rnv. 1183 (1972); and Harold Demsetz, Minorities in the Market Place,43 N.C. L. REv.
271 (1965).
66. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968), is an excellent illustration. The case
involved the constitutionality of a federal wagering statute that imposed an obligation to
annually register with the IRS and to pay an occupational tax on businesses accepting
wagers. The registrants are required to keep detailed records of their operation, including
names and addresses of employees and agents, and to provide certified copies of the
records, upon request, to any state. The state of Connecticut made gambling and wagering
punishable by criminal penalties. Marchetti refused to register because he feared the information given in a registration statement could be used by Connecticut to prosecute him.
He was convicted in a federal court under indictments that charged violation of the federal
wagering tax statute (i.e., for failure to register and for evading payment of the annual
occupational tax). Marchetti challenged the conviction on the ground that it violated his
privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme
Court, in a 7-2 decision, invalidated the law. The Court stated:
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Like any other rule of constitutional adjudication, the Davis rule
has its own ardent supporters and virulent critics. The rule of impactblindness was, in fact, instigated by some influential writers who consider the rule the bulwark of a color-blind constitution.67 In the abstract, the rule has the appearance of elegance and simplicity. In
reality, the rule is more of a theory of litigation avoidance than a
truth-seeking tool of constitutional adjudication. The fundamental
flaw of the Davis rule of intent, as accurately diagnosed by Professor
Alan Freeman, is that it is molded entirely from the perspective of the
perpetrator of racial discrimination rather than from the perspective
of its victims. 68 By adopting the rule, the Court has in effect "move[d]

the line defining de jure discrimination from that which has been
'69
caused by law to that which has been intentionally caused by law."

The issue before us is not whether the United States may tax activities which a
State or Congress has declared unlawful ....
The issue is instead whether the
methods employed by Congress in the federal wagering tax statutes are, in this
situation, consistent with the limitations created by the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.
Id. at 44. Moreover, "[t]he Constitution of course obliges this Court to give full recognition to the taxing powers and to measures reasonably incidental to their exercise. But we
are equally obliged to give full effect to the constitutional restrictions which attend the
exercise of those powers." Id. at 58.
67. The Davis Court was influenced by the writings of John Hart Ely who argued that
the intent rule is essential to assure the color blindness of the Constitution. He wrote in
1970: "Of course, the suggestion that a showing of disproportionate racial impact, whether
intended or not, should trigger judicial review has extremely far-reaching implications.
There are many towns and voting districts throughout the United States whose residents
are predominantly or exclusively white (not to mention those whose residents are largely
Protestant, Catholic, conservative, Republican or Democratic), and a number of them are
abutted by largely Negro (or whatever) communities. The implication for laws that concern subjects other than districting are probably even more far-reaching." John Hart Ely,
Legislative and Administrative Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw, 79 YALE LJ. 1205, 1256
(1970). The Davis Court based its rule of purposeful discrimination on Ely's "far-reaching" implication rationale. Professor Theodore Eisenberg would support an effect-based
cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause, but is still concerned about its implication on judging individuals on the basis of their merits. See Theodore Eisenberg, DisproportionateTheory of the ConstitutionalBan Against Racial Discrimination,15 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 1041 (1978). See also J. Morris Clark, Legislative Motivation and Fundamental
Rights in ConstitutionalLaw, 15 SAN DIEGO L. R:v. 953 (1978).
68. See Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A CriticalReview of Supreme Court Doctrine. 62 MINN. L. RIv. 1049,
1052-53 (1978) ("The perpetrator perspective sees racial discrimination not as conditions,
but as actions, or series of actions, inflicted on the victim by the perpetrator. The focus is
more on what particular perpetrators have done or are doing to some victims than it is on
the overall life situation of the victim class.").
69. Gayle Binion, "Intent" and Equal Protection: A Reconsideration, 397 Sup. Cr.
REv. 397, 401 (1983).
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The adverse effects of the Davis rule on the interests of racial

minorities are well articulated by knowledgeable scholars. Some of
the negative implications are worth reciting. The requirement that a
victim of discrimination prove the evil intent of the perpetrator operates as a nearly insurmountable burden that in most cases cannot be
met without "smoking gun evidence." As a result, victims of discrimination are discouraged from seeking judicial remedies.70 The intent
rule miserably fails to both capture the most pervasive forms of unconscious and subtle discrimination 7 ' and to address parallel and al-

ternative conceptions of discrimination. 72 The requirement of
purposeful discrimination relegates the judiciary to "play a severely
diminished role in ameliorating racial inequities." 73 Indeed, the judiciary has become somewhat insensitive to minority interests by being
"reluctant in nearly every case to acknowledge either existence or importance of illicit intent, unless it has been unable to imagine any
other explanation for the challenged policy."'74
The most pernicious aspect of the Davis rule is its rejection of a
cause of action based on the disproportionate racial impact of facially
neutral laws. The Court could have permitted victims of racial discrimination to sue either under a theory of disparate impact or a theory of disparate treatment just as it has done under Title VII
employment discrimination cases. 75 Under the disparate impact stan70. See Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent" Do We
Know How Legal Standards Work? 86 CoRmiri L. REv. 1151 (1991). The "striking finding" of the authors' empirical study was that there was low volume of intent litigation. The
authors stated "The Supreme Court's standard takes its toll not through an unusually high
loss rate for those plaintiffs reaching trial or appeal, but by deterring victims from even
filing claims." Id. at 1153. The authors arrived at those findings after analyzing all federal
district court and appellate court opinions published in the 12 years following Davis. As to
the type of evidence needed: "Intent claimant needs 'smoking gun' evidence of discrimination to prevail. Subtler methods of proof, though approved in Arlington Heights, rarely
carry the day." Id. at 1187-88.
71. See Lawrence, supra note 46; Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination,
141 U. PA. L. REv. 899 (1993).
72. The alternative conceptions of discrimination includes stigma, subordination, second-class citizenship, and lack of impartiality. See David A. Strauss, DiscriminatoryIntent
and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. Cn. L. Rnv. 935 (1989).
73. Michael J. Perry, The DisproportionateImpact Theory of Racial Discrimination,U.
PA. L. REv. 540, 588 (1977).
74. Binion, supra note 69, at 457.
75. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an employment discrimination suit
can be brought either under a disparate treatment theory which requires proof of employer-intent, or in the alternative, under a disparate impact theory which requires statistical showing of disproportionate effect on protected groups. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e§§ 2000e-17 (West 1999).
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dard established by the Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,76 and statutorily affirmed by Congress,7 7 any employment policy, practice or
criteria that has a disproportionate impact on a protected group such
as racial minorities must be justified by showing that the policy, prac78
tice or criteria is job related and consistent with business necessity.
The theory of disparate treatment requires the aggrieved employee to
prove the discriminatory intent of the employer.
The two standards of employment discrimination-disparate
treatment and disparate impact discrimination-have amicably co-existed under the roof of Title VII for nearly three decades. The disparate impact standard should similarly co-exist with the discriminatory
intent standard under the Equal Protection Clause. There is a compelling reason to create the coexistence. In a post-affirmative action
era, litigation grounded on disproportionate impact can be a potent
vehicle, probably the only vehicle, for the vindication of group grievances brought on behalf of racial minorities. "Racial group" is the
primary referent in a disparate racial impact claim. Even though the
relevant racial group is not entitled to group-wide relief, the individual
plaintiff in disparate impact litigation makes the claim of discrimination as a member of his or her racial group. By bringing in statistical
inter-group disparities, the plaintiff not only proves that she has been
personally subjected to discriminatory treatment, but also reveals the
underlying prejudices and stereotypes that prompted such treatment.79 Successful disparate impact litigation thus exposes widespread discriminatory practices that warrant group-focused remedial
action by the discriminator. In this sense, disparate impact litigation
could be considered a prophylactic device that might, in the long run,
obviate the need for race-based affirmative action remedies.
76. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Court held that employment "practices, procedures, or
tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they
operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices." Id. at
430.
77. In 1989, the Court tried to change some aspects of the Griggs rule in Wards Cove
PackingCo. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1982). Congress "overruled" the Wards Cove decision
by enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, and statutorily reinstated the disparate impact cause of action. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-§§ 2000e-17
(West 1999).
78. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981.
79. Stereotypes, racial or sexual, are a "set of attributes ascribed to a group and imputed to its individual members because they belong to that group." Mary F. Radford, Sex
Stereotypingand the Promotionof Women to Positionsof Power,41 HAsnN s LJ. 471, 487
(1990) (quoting M. E. Heilman, Sex Bias in Work Settings: The Lack of Fit Model, in
ORGAmZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 269, 271 (1983).
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Astonishingly, the Supreme Court has never bothered to authenticate the Davis rule by reference to the intent or history of the Equal
Protection Clause. Justice White, the architect of the Davis rule,
seemed to have "second thoughts" about its desirability. 80 Six months
after Davis, in the Arlington Heights case, he declined to join all the
other justices of the Washington v. Davis majority to reaffirm the
rule.8 1 Most critics have found the Davis rule improper or ill fitting
within the equality jurisprudence and suggest several avenues to
smooth the rough edges of the rule without repudiating it entirely.
First, critics suggest expanding the definition of intent to include-in
addition to purpose-knowledge, negligence and recklessness.8 2 Sec-

ond, they propose assigning accountability for foreseeable consequences of actions taken with or without intent.83 Finally, the critics
suggest imposing liability for unintentional disproportionate impact
reasonably attributable to race.' 4 The Court has not shown any inclination to accept any of the suggested changes. The Court's current
doctrine of equality exudes so much pessimism concerning race rela-

tions that some scholars have regrettably concluded that "it may be
too late to expect the Court to change."'85 Realistically, it would be

prudent to accept the disproportionate impact-discriminatory purpose
rule of Davis as a fait accompli and to implore judicial solicitude for
relinquishing its frivolous method of the rule's implementation.
B. Neutral's Obligation to Prove Neutrality

The rule of Washington v. Davis is entirely built on the doctrinal
foundation of neutrality. A facially neutral law is shielded from Equal
Protection challenge because it is presumed to be nondiscriminatory.
80. 4 THE JusTicEs OF THE SUPREME COURT: THEIR LIVES AD MAJOR OPINIONS
1586 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1997).
81. Id. ("In footnote twelve of the Washington v. Davis opinion, Justice White had
specifically disapproved of the approach which the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had
taken in Arlington Heights, thus anticipating the reversal by the Supreme Court seven
months later. But Justice White nevertheless dissented when the legal issue involved in
Arlington Heights was finally presented to the Supreme Court.").
82. See Pamela S. Karlan, DiscriminatoryPurposeand Mens Rea: The TorturedArgument of Invidious Intent, 93 YALE L.L 111 (1983).
83. See William E. Boyd, Purpose and Effect in the Law of Race Discrimination: A
Response to Washington v. Davis, 57 U. DET. J. URB. L. 707, 741 (1980); Owen M. Fiss,
Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 J. PHIL. & PuB. AF. 107 (1976).
84. See Theodore Eisenberg, DisproportionateImpact and Illicit Motive: Theories of
ConstitutionalAdjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 36, 57 (1977).
85. Selmi, supra note 51, at 350; see also Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution in Color-blind," 44 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1991).
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A law can be called nondiscriminatory only if it is impartial,8 6 treating
similarly situated persons alike without favoring one over the other.
A nondiscriminatory law is, by definition, neutral. Therefore, the Davis rule says that a facially neutral law is in compliance with the Equal
Protection Clause because the law is presumed to be neutral. If anyone wants to challenge the presumption, the challenger has to not
only show that the law is non-neutral, but also that the law is made
non-neutral purposefully. Thus, neutrality is central to the Davis rule
and, if neutrality were taken out of the equation, the rule would collapse for lack of foundation.
Neutrality is not a self-defining term. In fact, it is a complex concept, a "coat of many colors."' Given the centrality of the concept in
Equal Protection jurisprudence, it becomes incumbent on the
Supreme Court to define the meaning and contours of neutrality.
John Hart Ely, who ventured to read the Fourteenth Amendment
"only to require [governmental] 'neutrality' toward [racial minori-

ties]" and not to "favor" them, immediately attached a rider that
"[t]he difficult question is what neutrality ought to mean in this context.""8 There is general agreement that the government cannot classify people on the basis of their race or gender for imposing burdens or
granting benefits without violating neutrality. There is no consensus
on the question whether governmental action that disproportionately
disadvantages racial minorities or women would comport with the

neutrality principle.
The disagreement on the question stems at least in part from a
serious lack of understanding of the traditional and generally accepted
meaning and rationale of neutrality as a precept used in legal discourse. Neutrality is a mature and well-understood concept in international law. It is worthwhile for our judiciary to look to international
law for some much needed insight and guidance. Generally, neutrality in international law is the war time status of neutral nations "who
take no one's part, remaining friends common to both parties, and not
86. For a full description of the identity of the discriminatory intent test and the concept of impartiality, see Strauss, supra note 72, at 937 ("Both its strengths and weaknesses
lie inthe fact that the discriminatory intent test reflects a requirement of impartiality: according to the discriminatory intent standard, invidious discrimination consists of a failure
to be impartial.").
87. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
88. Ely, supra note 67, at 1256. According to Ely, the neutrality requirement would
bar government classifications based on race, but only bar those actions disproportionately
disadvantaging racial minorities with intent to disadvantage, fearing that, otherwise, the
Fourteenth Amendment would be construed as an "affirmative command of racial balance." Id. at 1256, 1257.
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favoring the armies of one of them to the prejudice of the other."' 9
General international law imposes on a neutral nation the duty to fulfill its obligations and exercise its rights "in an equal (that is, impartial
or nondiscriminatory) manner toward all belligerents." 90 In addition
to the duty of impartiality, the neutral has an obligation "of almost
equal importance" to abstain from furnishing forbidden goods and
services to either belligerent. The legal significance of the neutral's
status of nonparticipation in the war is that "it brings into operation
rules for the regulation of neutral-belligerent relations," 91 a set of
rules that stipulate "what a neutral power must do and not do to remain neutral."9
Neutral states are obliged to exercise due diligence for the purpose of preventing violations of their neutrality by either belligerent.
According to the rules recognized by the United States, "the due diligence of a neutral must be in proportion to the risks to which either
belligerent may be exposed from failure to fulfill the obligations of
neutrality on his part." 93 Violations of neutrality, committed intentionally or by culpable negligence are international delinquencies for
which the neutral may be held responsible for losses sustained by the
damaged belligerent. Neutrals' obligations of impartiality and nonparticipation have always been subject to surveillance and verification
through generally recognized mechanisms, such as visit and search of
neutral vessels to see whether they carry contraband of war. Mere
declarations of neutrals that they did not carry contraband need not
give them immunity from visit and search.94 During both world wars,
89. H. LAUTERPACHT, OPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 626 (7th ed. 1952) (definition by Vattel).
90. HANS KELSEN & ROBERT TUCKER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 156 (2nd
ed. 1967).
91. Id. at 154. Some of the basic rules that regulate the neutral belligerent relations
are codified in the Hague Convention XIII (1907).
92. ALAN MoNTEFioRE, NEUTRAUTY AND IMARTI4arY 131 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 1975). Montifiore defines neutrality "in terms of an agent's doing his best to help or
to hinder to an equal degree all the parties concerned in any situation of competition or
conflict." Id. at 6.
93. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 89, at 757. The rule was established by the Treaty of
Washington entered into by the United States and Great Britain on May 8, 1871. The rules
are known as "The Three Rules of Washington." See id. at 715.
94. Great Britain and other nations rejected the First Armed Neutrality of Netherland
in 1756 (in a war between France and England), and the second Armed Neutrality of Russia in 1780 (during the Napoleanic War). Under "Armed Neutrality," the belligerents
should not have a right of visit and search in case the commanding officer of a warship
under whose convoy neutral merchant vessels were sailing, should declare that the convoyed vessels did not carry contraband of war. See LAuTERPACHT, supra note 89, at 62731.
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belligerents seized goods immediately destined to neutral ports on the
ground that they were contraband of war ultimately destined for enemy territory. To determine ultimate destination, the belligerents established "a detailed and complex set of presumptions governing
hostile destination that the neutral trader must refute." 95 In sum, the
onus of establishing impartiality and nonparticipation rested on the
neutral rather than on the parties in conflict.
On a superficial level, the core requirement of neutrality under
the Equal Protection Clause is impartiality just as it is the core requirement under international law. To a degree uncommon in international law, the Equal Protection neutrality relieves the neutral from
its primary and incessant burden of establishing its own impartiality.
Under the Davis rule, the neutral's self-serving assertion of neutrality
imposes on the challenger the burden of establishing the professed
neutral's lack of impartiality. To make matters worse, the reverse burden requires the challenger to demonstrate that the neutral is deliberately partial. 96 When juxtaposed with the international law standard,
the Equal Protection neutrality's claim of impartiality is irreparably
undermined when the government and judiciary condone neutral behavior that disproportionately impacts minority groups. The very essence of neutrality is the neutral's obligation not to disproportionately
prejudice or favor any of the competing interests or contending parties among whom it assumes the position of a neutral. In international
law parlance, the Equal Protection neutrality would amount to nothing more than a misnomer.
C. The Doctrinal Quagmire
Equal protection neutrality, in its present formulation, is doctrinally abstract and substantively incoherent. It is a concept without
any clearly delineated structure or objectively defined meaning and,
as a result, Equal Protection neutrality is easily susceptible to whimsical and contradictory interpretations by judges of divergent philosophical and political persuasions. The current ambiguities and
uncertainties stem from the failure of the Supreme Court to make absolute and verifiable impartiality the touchstone of neutrality. Until
neutrality is properly anchored in the principle of impartiality and a
satisfactory analytic framework is devised to verify impartiality, Equal
Protection neutrality will remain ill-matched to the critical task it is
95. KELSEN & TUCKER, supra note 90, at 165.
96. As stated earlier, in international law, a neutral is liable for breaches of neutrality
committed intentionally or negligently.
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assigned to perform. The desirable transformation of the neutrality
into a mature and sophisticated concept worthy of its status in the
color-blind jurisprudence will not be possible until the Court renounces its practice of giving universal and uncritical deference to facial neutrality.
Systematic analysis of facial neutrality, especially of race-disadvantaging laws, can be considered a logical outgrowth of the
Supreme Court's color-blind doctrine. Probing facial neutrality to uncover concealed racial discrimination is perfectly consistent with the
strict scrutiny of racial classifications. As repeatedly stated by the
Court, "the purpose of strict scrutiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate
uses of race." 97 Looking behind the veil of facial neutrality, a court
may also find that a law "neutral in origin has been subverted to invidious purposes."98 Even when the neutrality inquiry reveals only lack
of governmental impartiality towards particular racial groups and not
government participation in invidious discrimination, the mere exposure of such impartiality will signify the Supreme Court's unwavering
commitment to vigorous enforcement of the principles of racial equality and governmental neutrality in the post-affirmative action era.99
By subjecting facially neutral race-disadvantaging laws to careful
judicial analysis, the Court will only be bringing its equal protection
jurisprudence to the level of sophistication that its First Amendment
jurisprudence has already attained. As explained in Part III, the
Court has formulated a framework to examine the impartiality of
facially neutral laws impinging on rights protected by the First
Amendment. Under that framework, the evidentiary burden for
proving neutrality remains on the government, rather than on the
party challenging the law's constitutionality. The Court's failure to
adopt a similar framework for neutrality analysis in equal protection
cases is unexplainable on any principled basis and is likely to fuel the
prevailing suspicion that the Court's equal protection neutrality is a
97. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) ("Indeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.").
The same statement was repeated in Adarand Constructors,Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,22526 (1995).
98. Roger v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 626 (1982) (citing Zimmer v. McKeithen 485 F.2d
1297 (5th Cir. 1973)).
99. The exposure of governmental impartiality towards a particular racial group will
also constitute an appropriate warning to the government that it should start looking for
alternatives to accomplish its legitimate legislative goals which may diminish or lessen the
adverse impact on minorities.
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concept of convenience primed for one-way application against the
°
interests of racial minorities10
There is no need to establish a system of indiscriminate and automatic inquiry into each and every facially neutral law. Some categories of facially neutral laws could be safely exempted from any inquiry
absent showing of prohibited racial purpose.1"'
Any non-exempt
facially neutral law that bears more heavily on one race than another
should, however, trigger judicial scrutiny of the law's impartiality.
Disparate impact-producing neutrality is an oxymoron. A facially
neutral law that impacts disproportionately on a minority race is not
impartial and, therefore, is not presumptively neutral. The loss of the
neutrality shield ipso facto renders the law reviewable at the behest of

the disadvantaged minority.
Of course, the mere discovery of lack of impartiality of a facially
neutral law need not entitle the disparately impacted racial group to
judicial remedies. If the neutrality inquiry reveals that the object or
purpose of a law is racial discrimination, the law will be subject to
strict scrutiny and the proponents of the law will be required to
demonstrate that the law is narrowly tailored to further a compelling
100. The validity and effectiveness of the principle of race neutrality in equal protection

jurisprudence are subjects of intense scholarly debate. See e.g.,

RANDALL KENNEDY,

CRiM AND THE LAW (1997) (advocating race neutrality by treating persons strictly
on the basis of conduct rather than color in the context of criminal law enforcement); Sheri
Lynn Johnson, Respectability, Race Neutrality, and Truth, 107 YALE L.J. 2619, 2622 (1998)
(criticizing Professor Kennedy's doctrinal commitment to race neutrality and arguing "that
the prevailing doctrine of race neutrality has cabined the search for solutions to issues of
racial fairness by labeling them nonissues").
The Supreme Court seems to apply a double standard in the application of its fledgling
neutrality principle. It is adamantly opposed to deviations from absolute governmental
impartiality when judging the constitutionality of race-advantaging laws such as affirmative
action, school desegregation, and legislative redistricting-a position in total harmony with
the traditionally accepted notion of neutrality. The proponents of race-advantaging laws
have the burden to justify, under strict scrutiny, even the slightest deviations from impartiality. In contrast, the Court applies a relaxed standard of neutrality to race-disadvantaging
laws. Facial appearance of neutrality of generally applicable laws alone will suffice the
constitutional requirement of impartiality even when the law produces a disproportionate
impact on racial minorities. In addition, the victims of the impact seeking judicial relief are
required to demonstrate the deliberate partiality of the law's proponent in order to
succeed.
101. General purpose laws such as revenue, custom and immigration laws, and most
regulations concerning health and safety would fall into these exempt categories. They
should be exempt from subterranean judicial inquiry partly because they are vulnerable to
more frivolous neutrality challenges by more potential plaintiffs than any other categories
of laws. They should be immune from neutrality challenges for the additional reason that
they are seldom racially targeted and in the event they are, the solution could be through
the political, rather than the judicial, process.
RACE,
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interest. 10 2 If the law's deviation from impartiality is not attributable
to racial bias, a reviewing court inclined to provide racial justice will
have at least two options to consider. It could either grant relief to the
disadvantaged racial group under the theory of disparate impact as
the Supreme Court has done under Title VI and VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,103 or the Court could require the proponents of

the facially neutral law to justify its lack of impartiality by providing a
race-neutral explanation that is reasonably trustworthy and nonpretextual.1 0 4 The requirement of race-neutral explanations will have

both short term and long term consequences. In the short term, the
102. Unlike the rule of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), the strict scrutiny will
be triggered here without the disadvantaged minority having to prove discriminatory intent
of the law's proponents.
103. Disparate impact as a basis for providing remedies in damages was recognized by
the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,436 (1971), and the Court's
subsequent effort to modify the Griggs cause of action was rebuffed by Congress, enacting
the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The Court, in a disparate impact suit under Title VI, granted
only injunctive and noncompensatory relief, requiring proof of discriminatory intent for
receiving monetary damages, on the ground that Title VI defendant's obligations were
contractual in nature and therefore subject to renouncement at the option of the defendant. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'r of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582 (1983) (plurality
opinion of Justice White).
104. "Race-neutral explanation" is a vastly misused term in the anti-discrimination law
of the Supreme Court. In 1973, the Court established a framework for inquiry into claims
of intentional employment discrimination on grounds of race. First, that the employeeplaintiff establish a prima facie case; second, that the employer offer a race-neutral explanation for the employment action; and third, that the employee show that the employer's
explanation was not the true reason, but was a pretext for discrimination. See McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1987). In 1993, the Court, in a 5 to 4 decision, ruled that the employer's
showing that the employer's race-neutral explanation was pretexual would not be enough
to get relief. Rather the employee has to prove that racial discrimination was the motive of
the employer, regardless of the truthfulness of the proffered explanation. See St. Mary's
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) (majority opinion of Justice Scalia). Four dissenting Justices, led by Justice Souter, complained that the majority's new burden allocation
will not only make it difficult for employees to prove discrimination, but also permit the
employer to present false evidence in the Court.
In a similar vein, the Supreme Court recently altered the rules for challenging raciallymotivated peremptory challenges under the Equal Protection Clause. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the Court created a three-step, burden-allocating procedure to
determine whether a prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges was race-based. The
second step required the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation. In 1995, the
Court in Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, held that the race-neutral explanation proffered by
a prosecutor need not be "persuasive or even plausible." Id. at 768. Justice Stevens, joined
by Justice Breyer, in dissent, complained that the new rule made the Batson requirement a
"meaningless charade" and that "[i]t would take little effort for prosecutors who are of
such a mind to adopt role 'neutral explanations' which bear facial legitimacy but conceal a
discriminatory motive." Id. at 773. See also David A. Stephen, True Lies: The Role of
Pretext Evidence Under Batson v. Kentucky in the Wake of St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks, 94 MicH. L. RFv. 488 (1995); Tracy Choy, BrandingNeutral ExplanationsPretexual
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law's defender will be tempted to explore the availability of alterna-

tives that might narrow or eliminate the disparate racial impact-a
measure of the future reasonableness of the law. 10 5 In the long term,
the defendant who is already put on notice of the lack of impartiality
of a facially neutral law could be held liable for knowing and deliber-

ate indifference to the law's adverse impact on racial
Il.
A.

minorities.

°6

The Neutrality Mirage

The Neutral Position

Despite its centrality in equal protection jurisprudence, neutrality
remains an elusive concept with fuzzy perimeters and undefined content. The meaning of neutrality is entirely dependant on the predilections and value judgments of the interpreter. Equal Protection
neutrality is such an open-ended phenomenon that it even enables
judges to paint a neutral face on a law that plainly and literally classifies on the basis of race or gender. The convoluted litigation concerning the constitutionality of the California Civil Rights Initiative,
popularly known as Proposition 209, yields this type of absurd interpretation of neutrality.
In 1996 California voters, by a margin of 54 to 46 percent,
adopted Prop. 209 as an amendment to the state constitution. Prop.
209, in relevant part, provided that the state "shall not discriminate
against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on
the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operaUnderBatson v. Kentucky: An Examination of the Role of the TrialJudge in Jury Selection,

48 HASTINGs LJ.577 (1997).
A race-neutral explanation, contemplated in this article, for lack of impartiality shown
after the neutrality inquiry should be credible. This neutral explanation here means something substantially different from the contorted meaning currently given to the term in
Purkett.
105. The Supreme Court has consistently stated in the affirmative action cases that the
lack of adequate consideration of race-neutral alternatives was an indication of the unreasonableness of race-disadvantaging laws. This remedy is very much akin to that fashioned
by the Court to deal with sexual harassment cases.
106. The Supreme Court has implied a private right of action for damages under Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., for sexual harassment
of a student by one of the teachers of the defendant school district. The Court in Gebser v.
Lago Vista Independent School District,524 U.S. 274 (1998), held that the school district
would be liable if it had actual notice of the harassment and it was deliberately indifferent
to the teacher's misconduct. See also Davis v. Monroe County Bd.of Educ., 526 U.S. 629
(1999) (holding the school district liable in damages for student-on-student sexual harassment on same grounds as in Gebser); Commissioner v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) (requiring showing of deliberate indifference to impose liability on a municipality for violation of
42 U.S.C. § 1983).
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tion of public employment, public education, or public contracting."' 1 7
The prohibition against discrimination and preference did not apply to
programs that may be required to be established or maintained to
avoid "loss of federal funds to the state."' 08 Since Prop. 209 was by its
terms "self-executing," it automatically invalidated conflicting race
and gender conscious affirmative action programs established by both
the state's public educational institutions and the state's hundreds of

cities, counties and special districts. 1°9
Racial minorities and others aggrieved or adversely affected by
Prop. 209 challenged its constitutionality in Coalition for Economic
Equality v. Wilson.110 The crucial question in the litigation was
whether Prop. 209 contained racial and gender classifications that de-

served strict scrutiny analysis or whether Prop. 209 was simply an innocuous neutral law raising no serious constitutional concern. Judging
from the plain language of Prop. 209 the answer seemed deceptively
simple. Prop. 209, in fact, contains a facial classification based on race
and gender. The proposition singles out racial and gender preferences

as the sole object of its prohibition, while leaving unscathed preferences based on other criteria, such as age, disability and veteran's status. Since the prevailing equal protection jurisprudence of the

Supreme Court is resolutely classification-driven, Prop. 209 "ought to
receive strict scrutiny, and so scrutinized, the [law] should have a diffi-

cult time""' to pass constitutional muster.
107.

CAL.

CONST. art. I,

§ 31(a).

108. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(e). This provision was designed to avoid conflicts between
Prop. 209 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which prohibits discrimination in
federally funded programs. Prop. 209 also stated that it shall not be interpreted "as
prohibiting bonafide qualifications based on sex which are reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of public employment, public education or public contracting." CAL.
CoNsT. art. I, § 31(c).

109. The vast local government network of California is comprised of 500 cities, 58
counties and 5000 special districts. See Jenna Ward, Plaintive About Prop. 209, THE RECORDER, DEC. 5, 1997, at 7 (citing Note, The Constitutionality of Proposition209 As Applied, 111 HAIv. L. REv. 2081, 2082 n.11 (1998)).

110. 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
111. Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE LJ. 427, 470 (1997). Professor
Rubenfeld advocated the position that "[t]he Constitution permits [race-conscious] affirmative action because affirmative action does not force a second-class status or citizenship
on anyone." In the same vein, he concludes that Prop. 209, in spite of its racial classification should not trigger heightened scrutiny because it "is not an untouchability law...
because it denies no rights to minorities or women that it bestows upon whites or men."
Id. For a forceful argument in support of subjecting Prop. 209 to strict scrutiny analysis
because of the law's facially racial classification, see Girardeau A. Spann, Proposition209,
47 Dux L.J. 187, 247(1997).
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Despite the clear facial classification of Prop. 209, both the district court and the court of appeals chose to go beyond the plain language in search of the law's purpose and effects. Surprisingly, both
courts arrived at the same conclusion, albeit for different reasons, and
found that Prop. 209 was "facially neutral."' 12 The legal alchemy that
transformed the facially explicit race and gender classification into facial neutrality may be somewhat mysterious, however, the transformation graphically illustrates the doctrinal vacuousness of Equal
Protection neutrality.
B.

Confusion of the District Court

The analytical confusion on the classification issue visibly permeated the district court's decision. The court, contradicting itself, stated
that the plain language of Prop. 209 "concededly contains no classification on its face""' and then concluded "that the initiative 'plainly
rests on distinctions based on race."" 4 Emphasizing that the purposes of Prop. 209 were to eliminate race and gender conscious affirmative action programs and to prevent their creation in the future, the
Court found that the law "was enacted 'because of', not merely 'in
spite of' its adverse effects upon affirmative action", and therefore,
"the measure was effectively drawn for racial purposes." 15 The court
also found that Prop. 209, despite its facial neutrality, violated the
Equal Protection Clause because it restructured the political process.
This restructuring disadvantages minorities and women seeking affirmative action programs by removing the authority to create such
programs from state and local government to a "new and remote level
of government," namely the state constitution." 6
In support of the theory that Prop. 209 resulted in unconstitutional political restructuring, the court relied on two Supreme Court
cases, Hunter v. Erickson and Washington v. Seattle School District. In
Hunter, the Court considered the constitutionality of an amendment
to the Akron city charter that prevented the city council from implementing any ordinance dealing with racial and religious discrimination
in housing without the approval of the voters of Akron. The Court
112. 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1502 (N.D. Cal. 1996); 122 F.3d 692, 702 (9th Cir. 1997).
113. Coalition of Econ. Equality v. Wilson, 946 F.Supp. 1480, 1502 (1996).
114. Id. at 1508 (quoting Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. 457, 485 (1982)).
115. Id. at 1506 (citing Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. at 471).
116. Id. The court noted that after the passage of Proposition 209, supporters and advocates of race and gender-based affirmative action would "face the considerably more
daunting task of mounting a statewide campaign to amend the California Constitution"
which would cost millions of dollars. Id. at 1499.
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struck down the amendment as violative of the Equal Protection
Clause because "although the law on its face treats Negro and White,
Jew and gentile in an identical manner, the reality is that the law's
impact falls on the minority" by placing a "special burden" on them
"within the governmental process."'1 7 At issue in Seattle School District was the constitutionality of a statewide initiative (Initiative 350)
that barred school boards from assigning students to attend schools
outside their neighborhoods. The Court found that "despite its facial
neutrality there [was] little doubt that the initiative was drawn for racial purposes"-to prevent desegregative busing." The Court held
that the initiative violated the Equal Protection Clause because it removed "the authority to address a racial problem - and only a racial
problem - from the existing11 decisionmaking
body in such a way as to
9
burden minority interests.
The district court in Coalition for Economic Equality v. Wilson
used the Seattle-Hunter analysis to determine whether the "facially
neutral" Prop. 209 "single[d] out race and gender issues for unique
120
political burdens" and therefore created a "suspect classification.'
Those determinations concerning Prop. 209, however, could have
been easily made without the aid of the Seattle-Hunteranalysis. First,
Prop. 209 was not facially neutral;' 21 Prop. 209 contained a facially
suspect classification. Second, Prop. 209 did not impose unique political burdens on racial minorities and women.' 2 2 To the extent that
racial and gender preferences were permitted or mandated by the
Federal Constitution, they remained unaffected by Prop. 209. Minori117. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385,391 (1969). The Court explained, "[t]he majority
needs no protection against discrimination and if it did, a referendum might be bothersome
but no more than that." Id.
118. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. at 471.
119. Id. at 474.
120. 946 F. Supp. at 1503. The court rejected defendant's argument against the SeattleHunter analysis stating that they "cannot use Proposition 209's facial neutrality as a shield
against the application of the Seattle-Hunter analysis; it is precisely the measure's facial
neutrality that makes the application of these cases appropriate." Id. at 1502.
121. For a comprehensive articulation of the fallacy of the neutrality argument, see Girardeau A. Spann, Proposition209, 47 DuKE L.J. 187; Neil Gotanda, Failureof the ColorBlind Vision: Race, Ethnicity and the California Civil Rights Initiative, 23 HASTiNGs
CONST. L.Q. 1135 (1996).
122. For a forceful argument that Prop. 209 imposed unequal political burden on minorities and women, see Vikram Amar & Evan Caminker, Equal Protection, Unequal
PoliticalBurdens, and the CCRI, 23 HAsTirs CONST. L.Q. 1019 (1996). Surprisingly, the
Ninth Circuit "accept[ed] without questioning the district court's findings that Proposition
209 burdens members of insular minorities ... who otherwise would seek to obtain racebased and gender-based preferential treatment from local entities." Coalition for Econ.
Equality v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 705 (9th Cir. 1997).
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ties and women would not be restricted from benefiting from legislation that incorporated those legitimate preferences enacted at any
level of government. Therefore, if Prop. 209 offended the Equal Protection Clause, it was not because the law reordered the political process, but because either its facial classification or its intentionally
produced disproportionate impact on minorities and women would
not survive equal protection scrutiny."z It was quite unnecessary for
the court to engage in the convoluted Seattle-Hunteranalysis for finding an equal protection violation, 2 4 especially in light of the court's
alternative finding that Prop. 209 violated the Supremacy Clause of
the Federal Constitution."z The court should have been mindful that
its decision would stand or fall solely on the soundness of the legal
rationale on which it chose to premise its decision.
C.

Artful Obfuscation of the Ninth Circuit

The Seattle-Hunter analysis further made it easier for the Ninth
Circuit to reverse, in its entirety, the Coalitionfor Economic Equality
v. Wilson decision. 1 26 The appeals court rejected the Seattle-Hunter

analysis as inapposite to Prop. 209's constitutionality and asserted that
Crawford v. Board of Education'27 was the controlling precedent. In
123. Since the court characterized Prop. 209 as "facially neutral," the proper approach
would have been to analyze it under the rule of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976),
and Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), that required a showing of

intentional discrimination to invalidate a facially neutral law that has a disproportionate
impact on minorities and women. The district court has already found that Prop. 209 disproportionately burdened minorities and women, and that it was enacted "because of" and
not simply "in spite of" its disparate impact. Therefore, it was quite unnecessary to subject
Prop. 209 to the Seattle-Hunter analysis.
124. There is substantial doubt concerning the continued viability of the Seattle-Hunter
doctrine in light of the Supreme Court's constantly changing equal protection jurisprudence. For writings expressing such skepticism, see Derrick A. Bell, Jr., California'sProposition 209: A Temporary Diversion on the Road to RacialDisaster,30 Loy. L.A. L. Rv.
1447, 1461 (1997) ("Reluctantly, I would then express doubt as to their [Hunter and Seattle
School District] continued viability .... "); Martin D. Carcieri, A ProgressiveReply to the
ACLU on Proposition209, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 141, 172 (1998) ("[E]ven if [District

Court] Judge Henderson used Seattle School Districtin a legitimate manner, it is a sixteenyear-old, five-to-four decision by a much more liberal court than the Court sitting today.");
Jeffrey Rosen, Stare Indecisis, Tim NE w REPUBLIC, Dec. 23, 1996, at 16 ("[L]ike dinner
guests that have overstayed their welcome, unconvincing Supreme Court opinions [like
Seattle School District] tend to linger long after their shortcomings have been exposed.")
(citing 39 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 141, 172 (1998)).
125. The court found that Prop. 209 conflicted with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 that preempted Prop. 29 in the area of employment law. See Wilson, 946 F. Supp. at
1503.

126. 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 963 (1997).
127. Crawford, 458 U.S. 527 (1982), was a companion case to Washington v. Seattle
School District,458 U.S. 457 (1982).
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Crawford, the Supreme Court upheld an amendment to the California
Constitution (Proposition I) that curtailed the authority of state courts
to order school busing where busing was not strictly required by the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court, rejecting an equal protection
challenge by minority students, held that the constitutional amendment was a "mere repeal of race-related legislation" and that, despite
its potentially discriminatory effect on desegregative busing,'28 the
amendment did
not embody "a presumptively invalid racial
1' 29
classification.'
In Wilson, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the political impediment
theory of the Seattle-Hunter cases, emphasizing that individuals have
equal protection rights only "against political obstructions to equal
treatment" but not "against political obstruction to preferential treatment.' 3 0° The appellate court, mimicking the Crawford opinion, asserted that Prop. 209 merely repealed race and gender related
"'legislation or policies that were not required by the Federal Constitution in the first place.' "1131 The court explicitly found no race-gender
classification in Prop. 209, and theorized that "[a] law that prohibits
the state from classifying individuals by race or gender a fortiori does
not classify individuals by race or gender.' 3 2 Not only did the court
treat Prop. 209 as a law addressing race and gender related matters in
a "neutral fashion," but the court also viewed Prop. 209 as an exact
replica of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 3
The Supreme Court's Crawford decision lends no support to the
Ninth Circuit's assertion that Prop. 209 was nothing more than a restatement of the Equal Protection Clause. Prop. 209's indiscriminate
prohibition against racial and gender preferences tracked neither the
language nor interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. Even the
128. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 539 (stating that racially discriminatory effect devoid of a
discriminatory purpose would not be unconstitutional).
129. Id. at 539. The Court stated that unlike the law in Seattle School District,under the
amendment in Crawford, the school districts remained free to adopt student reassignment
and busing plans to effectuate needed desegregation. Id. at 536 n.12.
130. Wilson, 122 F.3d at 708. The court also made the point that Seattle-Hunterdecisions that dealt with "group rights" are irreconcilable with the more recent equal protection cases that emphasize that equal protection is a personal right of the individual. Id. at
704-05.
131. Id. at 706 (quoting Crawford, 458 U.S. at 538).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 709. The court stated that, "[a]s in Crawford, '[i]t would be paradoxical to
conclude that by adopting the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
voters of the State thereby had violated it."' Id. (quoting Crawford, 458 U.S. at 535).
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Supreme Court's Adarand decision,'134 which the circuit court readily
espoused and adored, renders preferences for remedying identified
discrimination constitutionally permissible. Prop. 209's blanket prohibition against preferences literally conflicts even with the most rigid
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. In sharp contrast to
Prop. 209, Proposition I, upheld in Crawford, specifically stated that
its prohibition against school busing did not apply to desegregative
busing required by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' 3 5 Surprisingly, the circuit court's opinion in Wilson is
totally bereft of any credible explanation for condoning a state prohibition of preferences that may be required by the United States Constitution. Instead, the court chose to trivialize the grave implications
of barring such permissible race or gender conscious preference when
it stated that the "Fourteenth Amendment... does not require what it
barely permits."' 3 6 The court should have realized that what the Constitution barely permits is still constitutional and that the reason the
Constitution barely permits race or gender based preference is because it is sometimes required by the Constitution itself. A state has
no constitutional standing to ban such preference.' 3 7
134. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
135. Proposition I stated in relevant part:
In enforcing [Proposition I] or any other provision of [the California] Constitution, no court of this state may impose upon the State of California or any public
entity board or official any obligation or responsibility with respect to the use of
pupil school assignment or pupil transportation, (1) except to remedy a specific
violation by such party that would also constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, and (2)
unless a federal court would be permitted under federal decisional law to impose
that obligation or responsibility upon such party to remedy the specific violation
of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
CAT. CoNsT. art. I § 7(a).
136. Coalition of Econ. Equality v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 709 (9th Cir. 1997) ("The
Fourteenth Amendment, lest we lose sight of the forest for the trees, does not require what
it barely permits."). The Court apparently believed that the State was free to ban such
preferences altogether, stating that the fact "the Constitution permits the rare race-based
or gender-based preference hardly implies that the state cannot ban them altogether.
States are free to make or not make any constitutionality permissible legislative classification." Id. at 708.
137. Decisions of the United States Supreme Court have established a firm rule that
States have no authority to prevent remedies sanctioned by the U.S. Constitution. See,
e.g., North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43,45-46 (1971) (striking down a
facially neutral anti-busing law, a unanimous Supreme Court held that the law "would
deprive school authorities of the one tool absolutely essential to fulfillment of their constitutional obligation to eliminate existing dual school system," and, therefore, that the "state
policy must give way when it operates to hinder vindication of federal constitutional guarantees."). It is also well established by the Court that states have an affirmative duty to
take whatever steps might be necessary to eliminate "root and branch" the effects of their
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In the context of public employment, Prop. 209 has encountered
serious conflicts with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The
Supreme Court has long recognized that "Congress intended voluntary compliance to be the preferred means of achieving the objectives
of Title VII."'13 8 For the purpose of eliminating manifest racial and
gender imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories, voluntarily established race and gender specific affirmative action programs
are considered perfectly legal and appropriate under Title VII.'3 9 An
"employer adopting a [voluntary affirmative action] plan need not
point to its own prior discriminatory practices nor even to evidence of
an 'arguable violation' on its part.' 40 As Justice O'Connor stated in
Johnson v. TransportationAgency, no case decided under the Equal
Protection Clause or Title VII places a burden on employers to prove
that they actually discriminated against women and minorities in order to justify race or gender conscious affirmative action.' 41 These
permissive rules are designed to give maximum latitude to employers
who are "trapped between the competing-hazards of liability to
nonminorities if affirmative action is not taken to remedy apparent
employment discrimination and liability to nonminorities if affirmative action is taken."' 4 2 Under these rules, public employers desiring
to establish race and gender specific affirmative action enjoy as much
discretion as their counterparts in the private sector.143
past discriminatory practices. See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). The
constitutional obligation of a state to eradicate racial discrimination would not be satisfied
by simply establishing race-neutral policies. See United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717
(1992).
138. Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 515
(1986).
139. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
140. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 630 (majority opinion by Justice Brennan, citing the concurring opinion of Justice Blackmun in Weber, 443 U.S. at 209).
141. See id. at 652 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
142. Id. at 652 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 267, 291 (1986)). See also United Steel Workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 210 (1979)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that employers facing Title VII disparate impact liability are forced to walk "a high tightrope without a net beneath them").
143. The Supreme Court has passed up every opportunity to set different employment
discrimination rules for public and private employers. See e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency,
480 U.S. 616 (1987) (deciding validity of voluntary affirmative action of a public employer
under rules established for private employer); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167
(1987) (plurality opinion) (approving a court-imposed employment quota stating that the
"Government unquestionably ha[d] a compelling interest in remedying past and present
discrimination by a state actor").
Uniform employment discrimination rules for public and private employers is unavoidable. As Justice O'Connor stated in Wygant, public employers who have the constitu-
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Prop. 209's absolute prohibition of race and gender based employment preferences deprives public employers of their discretion to
establish the affirmative action programs that the Supreme Court considers vital to the achievement of Title VII's purposes. The district
court, therefore, correctly found that Prop. 209 was pre-empted by
Title VII. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court on its erroneous understanding that Prop. 209 was "entirely consistent" with the
"plain language of Title VII.'"1 In so doing, the circuit court totally
ignored the Supreme Court's time-tested interpretations that inform
the meaning of Title VIl's plain language.
D. Inadvertent Unmasking of the Neutrality Face
What is most amazing about the Wilson litigation is not that the
two state courts reached diametrically opposed decisions based on the
same mostly uncontested factual findings, but that both courts thought
it expedient to paint a mask of neutrality on the face of Prop. 209 to
reach those decisions. It was intuitively apparent to anyone that the
purpose of Prop. 209 was to eliminate existing, and prevent the establishment of future, race and gender-based affirmative action programs
throughout the state of California. The law's immediate and predictable effect was to deprive racial minorities and women educational,
employment and contracting opportunities that would have been
available to them by virtue of those programs. The Ninth Circuit's
assertion that Prop. 209 was a neutral law enacted for a neutral purpose was purely specious. Inferred from its own admissions, the court
"accept[ed] without questioning the district court's findings that Prop.
209 burdens members of insular minorities... who otherwise would
seek to obtain race-based and gender-based preferential treatment
from local entities."' 45 A law that imposes burdens on minorities, and
only on minorities, by definition, is not neutral.
tional duty to take affirmative steps to eliminate the continuing effects of discrimination
should be permitted to take remedial action, as the private employers who have no similar
constitutional duty are permitted to take. 476 U.S. 267, 291 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
144. Coalition for Econ. Equality v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692,710 (9th Cir. 1997). Whether
employers are permitted to establish remedial affirmative action to deal with their own
past or present discriminatory employment practices is a question that cannot be answered
by looking at the plain language of Title VII alone. See Constitutionalityof Proposition209
As Applied, 111 HARV. L. Rnv. 2081, 2098 (stating that the Ninth Circuit by examining the
preemption issue without "grappl[ing] with the Supreme Court's emphasis on the importance of voluntary affirmative efforts to achieve Title VII's purpose," evaded the real issue
raised by Prop. 209, namely, whether 209 permits to "lock in the vestiges of past discrimination by disabling violators from complying with the Constitution and Title VII").
145. Wilson, 122 F.3d at 705.
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The admission most menacing to the credibility of the court's
neutrality claim was made, rather obliquely, in a footnote. Note 18 of
the circuit court's opinion stated that "[t]o the extent that Prop. 209
prohibits race and gender preferences to a greater degree than the
Equal Protection Clause, it provides greater protection to members of
the gender and races otherwise burdened by the preference."' 4 6 It
went on to point out the "sovereign rights" of states to provide "individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal
Constitution." 14 7 The admission that Prop. 209 prohibited preferences
to a "greater degree than the Equal Protection Clause contradicted
the court's refrain that the law was just a restatement of the Equal
Protection Clause.' 148 The most poignant issue raised by note 18 is
whether a state law can provide, consistent with the Equal Protection
Clause, "greater protection" to the white majority and male gender
burdened by the preference. By declining to review the Ninth Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court has passed up the opportunity to
rule on the question. It is clear that California cannot be permitted to
confer greater protection to any race or gender because, by adopting
Prop. 209, the state had prohibited itself conferring the greater protection. Of course, states are free to provide greater rights to their citizens, but they cannot provide fewer rights than ensured by the Federal
Constitution and laws. 4 9 California, through Prop. 209, has done just
that by depriving minorities and women of their right, under the
Equal Protection Clause and Title VII, to receive the benefit of remedial affirmative action programs that would compensate for past
discrimination.
Instead of declassifying the facially explicit race and gender classification of Prop. 209 the Wilson courts should have examined its validity under strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated
that "the standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not
dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular

146. Id. at 709.
147. Id. (citing Prune Yard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980)).
148. For instance, the Court stated earlier in the opinion that "[a]s in Crawfordit would
be paradoxical to conclude that by adopting the Equal Protection Clause, the voters of the
state thereby had violated it." Wilson, 122 F.3d at 709 (citing Crawford,458 U.S. at 535).
149. The Ninth Circuit failed to adequately address the crucial question whether the
state can legitimately ban race and gender based affirmative action so categorically without
impermissibly disclaiming its constitutional duty to eradicate and remedy the effects of past
discrimination. See United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992); Romer v. Evans, 517

U.S. 620 (1996).
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classification,"' 150 rather an important purpose of strict scrutiny is to
ensure that "there is little or no possibility that the motive for the
classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype."'151 To
survive strict scrutiny, California would have to demonstrate that
Prop. 209 is a narrowly tailored law needed to achieve a compelling
state interest. More specifically, the state must either show that the
categorical ban on racial and gender-based affirmative action is necessary to provide "greater protection to the gender and race burdened
by the preference" of the state interest as seen by the Ninth Circuitor that it is necessary to promote abstract universal equality-the purported compelling state interest. California could very well pass strict
scrutiny if it presents sufficient evidence to show that racial and gender preferences impose undue burden on the majority whites and
males. 2 According to Justice O'Connor, even clearly remedial affirmative action plans would be unconstitutional if they "impose disproportionate harm on the interests, or unnecessarily trammel the
rights, of innocent individuals directly and adversely affected by a
plan's racial preference.' 53 She maintains that this is one of the "core
principles" where there is general agreement among the members of
the Supreme Court. 5 4 Providing proof of such a disproportionate
burden may be a daunting task but strict scrutiny demands nothing
less. Allowing a facially explicit racial and gender classification to bycover of neutrality should never be a
pass strict scrutiny under the 55
option.'
viable
constitutionally
IV.
A.

Discriminator's Neutral Safe Harbor

Echoes Across Legal Frontiers

Cast in the role of the unyielding gatekeeper of judicial review,
facial neutrality has demonstrated its capacity to provide fortified constitutional sanctuaries to wide-ranging governmental decisions that
150. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 448 U.S. 469, 494 (1989)) (plurality opinion).
151. Id. at 215 (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 493, plurality opinion of Justice O'Connor).
152. See K.G. Jan Pillai, Affirmative Action: In Search of a National Policy, 2 TEMPLE
PoL. & Crv. RTs. L. REv. 1, 13-22 (1992).
153. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 287 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
154. Id. at 287.
155. For forceful arguments in favor of strict scrutiny, see Girardeau A. Spann, Proposition 209, 47 DuKic L.I. 187, 248 (1997) ("The application of heightened scrutiny provides
the only way to prevent a race or gender classification from evading detection by masquerading as something other than a race or gender classification-which is precisely what
Proposition 209 seems successfully to have done before the court of appeals.").
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unabashedly disadvantage, and even discriminate against, racial minorities. There is mounting evidence that environmental, healthcare
and law enforcement decisions, ostensibly made under facially raceneutral criteria, impose inequitable and disproportionate burdens on
the socio-economic well-being of racial minorities. 56 In most such
cases, the affected minorities can easily demonstrate the biased character of the purported facial neutrality, as well as the disproportionality of its impact. Affected minorities, however, invariably end up
without legal remedy because of their inability to pinpoint or prove
the race-targeting motivation or purpose of the decisionmaker as required by the prevailing neutrality jurisprudence.
Racial minorities across the country have found themselves in
this impossible predicament whenever they have sought judicial remedies for racially disadvantaging environmental practices. These practices are now rather charitably and euphemistically dubbed
"environmental racism."' 57 There is undisputed evidence that a disproportionate number of communities heavily inhabited by African
Americans and I-Ispanics are also home to solid waste landfills and
other hazardous waste disposal facilities that expose the inhabitants to
toxic chemicals and pollutants that cause cancer, birth defects and
neurological disorders.' 5 8 Sporadic efforts by the affected communities to secure environmental equality and justice under the Equal Protection Clause have been rebuffed by the federal courts solely for
failure to prove the requisite discriminatory purpose. 59 The govern156. See supra notes 163-190 and accompanying text.
157. Jill E. Evans, Challenging the Racism in Environmental Racism: Redefining the
Concept of Intent,40 ARiz.L. R. 1219 (1998). Environmental racism is defined as "distinct
and identifiable racially-based conduct resulting in an inequitable distribution of environmental burdens on minority communities." Id at 1221. See also ROBERT D. BULLARD,
DUMPING IN DIXIE 8 (1994) ("Residential segregation today makes people of color vulnerable to toxic 'attacks' in much the same way that segregation in the 19th Century had
African-Americans vulnerable to less subtle attacks."); Gerald Torres, Introduction: UnderstandingEnvironmental Racism, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 839 (1992) (emphasizing the concepts of subordination and domination as integral to environmental racism).
158. See Regina Austin & Michel Shill, Black, Brown, Red and Poisoned, in UNEQuAL
PROTECION, ENvmoINMENTAL JusnCE AND CoMMUNITIES OF COLOR (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994); Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection: The RacialDivide
in Environmental Law, 15 NAT'L L. J. 3 (1992).
159. See Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex.
1979), affd without opinion, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986); R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F.
Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991); East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County
Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989), affd by 896 F.2d 1264
(11th Cir. 1989). See also Paul Mohai & Bunyon Bryant, EnvironmentalRacism: Reviewing the Evidence, in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENvmoNmNTAL HAZARDs: A TRAr
FOR DIscOURsE 163 (Paul Mohai & Munyon Bryant eds., 1992).
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ment entities that determine the location and feasibility of waste facilities invariably use facially race-neutral site selection criteria despite
the fact that the criteria more often than not correlate to minority
communities. 160
Searching for discriminatory purpose in site selection of waste
disposal facilities is a futile pursuit,161 even for a court sympathetic to
a plaintiff alleging environmental racism. The federal court decision
Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corporation62 is an appropriate illustration. The plaintiffs in Bean challenged the Texas Department of Health's ("TDH") grant of a permit to operate a waste
disposal facility in their predominantly black community, alleging that
the permit decision was "part of a pattern or practice"' 63 of racial discrimination by TDH in selecting solid waste sites. The Northwest
Manor in Houston, the proposed landfill site, close to a predominantly
black high school and a residential neighborhood, was selected on the
heels of a decision eight years earlier to reject such a facility in the
same general area when the school and neighborhood were predominantly white. 64 In fact, out of the thirteen waste disposal facilities
owned and operated by the city during the previous five decades,
twelve were located in predominantly black neighborhoods.
The district court found the permit decision "unfortunate," "insensitive," and not consistent with prudent "[1]and use considerations.' 1 65 The Court stated that it "simply [did] not make sense to put
a solid waste site so close to a high school.., or so close to a residential neighborhood" and that it "might very well have denied [the] permit" if it were in the position of TDH.1 66 However, the court was
160. See Benjamin A. Goldman et al., Toxic Waste and Race Revisited: An Update of
the 1987 Report on the Racial and Socioeconomic Characteristicsof Communities With
Hazardous Waste Sites, in ENVmoImETAL PROTECnON AND JusncE 169 (Kenneth A.
Manaster ed., 1995).
161. See Richard J. Lazarus, Distributionin EnvironmentalJustice: Is There a Middle
Ground, 9 ST. JoHN's I. LEGAL CoMnm" 481 (1994) (arguing that environmental decisions are dependant on multiple variables, including economics, politics and race).
162. 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979), affJd without opinion, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir.
1986).
163. Id. at 677.
164. In 1970, the permit to build the facility was rejected on the ground that it would be
too close to the school, present unreasonable health hazards, and reduce property values.
In 1978 when the new facility was permitted, such concerns simply vanished. See Robert
D. Bullard, EnvironmentalRacism and 'Invisible' Communities, 96 W. VA. L. REv. 1037,
1038-39 (1994).
165. Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 679, 680.

166. Id. at 680.
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hamstrung by the legal requirement of purposeful discrimination
which the plaintiffs unfortunately failed to meet in the case.

The Bean case demonstrates that evidence of a disproportionate
concentration of hazardous waste disposal facilities in minority communities may not lead a court to draw inferences of discriminatory
purpose by government decisionmakers.' 67 It is difficult for plaintiffs

seeking environmental justice to isolate and highlight racially motivated purpose in siting decisions claimed to have been made with consideration to indistinguishably blended race-neutral factors and
criteria. The courts inclined to protect minority communities from environmental predations will remain frustrated so long as they continue
to search for the elusive and nebulous discriminatory purpose in de-

ciding the location of waste facilities. Thus, it would have made more
sense if the Bean Court, instead of looking for discriminatory purpose
or discriminatory effect, had made an empirical analysis of the sub-

stance of neutrality when the government (TDH) claimed that its permit decision was made according to a facially race-neutral criteria.
The government would then have had a difficult time in explaining the
accumulation of hazardous waste facilities in predominantly minority
communities as a simple coincidence or the unfortunate outcome of a
truly neutral process.' 68 Unless and until the courts adopt such a constructive analysis, "plaintiffs pursuing environmental racism claims
169
[will be] left holding the garbage bag."

The pervasive use of facially neutral criteria that are intentionally
or inadvertently used to make race disadvantaging decisions is not the
exclusive preserve of environmental laws. The practice is widely prey167. In the Bean case, the Court could have easily drawn the inference of racially discriminatory purpose in granting the permit. As Professor Bullard has observed: "Black
Houstonians did not follow the garbage dumps and incinerators ....The racial character
of these neighborhoods was established before the waste facilities were sited." Bullard,
supra note 164, at 1040 (emphasis in original).
168. Some scholars forcefully argue that the courts should apply a modified intent standard or a suitable substitute standard in evaluating claims of environmental racism. See
Kathy Seward Northern, Battery and Beyond: A Tort Law Response to Environmental
Racism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL L. & PoL'Y REv. 485, 583 (1997) (proposing a new
category of "environmental racism tort" in which intent would be inferred where the defendant acts with substantial certainty "that its decisions to site the facility will result in a
minority community shouldering more than its proportionate share of the city, state, region
or nation's environmental burden"); Evans, supra note 157, at 1221-22, 1297 (proposing
"expansion of the intent standard established ...in Washington v. Davis consistent with
the expansive historical interpretation of intent in civil tort law," i.e., determining purpose
of a governmental action "by those natural and probable consequences that are substantially certain to occur").
169. Leslie Ann Coleman, Comment, It's the Thought that Counts: The Intent Requirement in Environmental Racism Claims, 25 ST. MARY'S LJ.447, 492 (1993).
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alent in the delivery of health care' 7 0 and in criminal law enforcement.
Just as in environmental decisionmaking, it is generally hard to prove
racial intent or motivation' 7 ' in medical decisionmaking because of
the fungibility of the variables that constitute expert medical justification.172 While it is not impossible to discern racial bias in medical and
environmental decisionmaking,'7 3 it is almost impossible to crack
open the facial neutrality of criminal law enforcement decisions and to
expose any underlying racial bias. Traditionally, criminal law enforcement is insulated from challenges based on racial discrimination by
the doctrine of prosecutorial discretion. 74
B. The Case of Racial Profiling. The New Jersey Example
The New Jersey State police have been stopping and searching

black and Hispanic motorists in disproportionate numbers on the New
Jersey Turnpike for years. 175 The practice, known as racial profiling,
has been repeatedly condemned by minority communities, civil rights
leaders and state and federal legislators representing New Jersey.

State officials responsible for law enforcement have always denied
170. See Marian E. Gormick et al., Effects of Race and Income on Mortality and Use of
Services Among Medicare Beneficiaries, 335 New Eng. J. Med. 791 (1996) (describing the
findings of a study conducted by a team of investigators affiliated with the Health Care
Financing Administration using data concerning more than 26 million medicare beneficiaries. The study revealed pervasive racial inequities in the delivery of health care services). See also Louis W. Sullivan, From the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 266
JAMA 2674 (1991) ("I contend that there is clear, demonstrable, undeniable evidence of
discrimination and racism in our health status of the general population has increased,
black health status has actually declined. This decline is not in one or two health categories, it is across the board, from an infant mortality rate for blacks that is double than for
whites to a life expectancy for black Americans that is 6 years less than that for white
Americans.").
171. See Barbara A. Noah, Racial Disparitiesin the Delivery of Health Care, 35 SAN
DIEGo L. Rnv. 135, 164 (1998).
172. See Developments in the Law - Medical Technology and the Law, 103 Harv. L. Rev.
1519, 1636 (1990) ("[F]actors that are admittedly relevant in determining whether a particular patient will be a good transplant recipient, such as occupation, educational level, and
family environment, might be used as yardsticks of social worth or means by which unconscious stereotypes influence patient selection.").
173. Significantly, minorities disproportionately affected by facially neutral programs
run or funded by the federal government may, in limited circumstances, be eligible for
administrative remedies from funding agencies. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
prohibits racial discrimination by recipients of federal funds. Moreover, the implementing
regulations of funding agencies invariably prohibits disparate racial impact in the administration or access to the funded programs.
174. See Development in the Law - Race and Prosecutor's Charging Decisions, 101
HARV. L. Rnv. 1520, 1521 (1988).
175. See Whitman Says Troopers Used Racial Profiling,N.Y. TRat-s, April 21, 1999, at
Al (Christine Todd Whitman is the Governor of New Jersey).
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that the practice ever existed and claimed that any perceived racial
disproportionality was incidental to race-neutral enforcement of the
state's drug and narcotics laws. The Superior Court of New Jersey, in
a criminal case,176 ruled that state police "engaged in intentional and
purposeful racial discrimination through a de facto policy of selectively stopping motor vehicles driven by African-American citizens in
a disproportionate manner to that of Caucasian citizens."'1 77 Judge
Robert Francis granted the criminal defendants' motion to suppress
evidence on the ground of racially selective prosecution. The state
appealed the interlocutory ruling to the Superior Court of New Jersey.
In a voluminous brief filed with the Superior Court, the state at-

torney general argued for the reversal of Judge Francis's ruling on the
178

ground that the defendants failed to discharge their "heavy burden"'
of proving discriminatory effect and discriminatory purpose. In addition to highlighting the deficiencies of the statistical evidence proffered by the defendants in the case, the state claimed that the
defendants "utterly failed to prove discriminatory effect since they did
not identify any similarly situated Caucasian individuals who were not
prosecuted" and thus, failed to "demonstrate a pattern of non-enforcement of the motor vehicle laws against non-blacks."'1 7 9 As to the
requirement of discriminatory purpose, the state, citing the Davis case
trilogy, insisted that the defendants failed to "relentlessly document
the existence of a conscious and deliberate discriminatory purpose
based on some unconstitutional category." 8 0 The state further ar176. See State of New Jersey v. Soto, 324 N.J. Super. 66, 734 A.2d 350 (1996).
177. Brief of Attorney General of New Jersey in State of New Jersey v. Pedro Soto, et.

al., No. A-5334-95T3 (filed October 21, 1997), at 4 (emphasis in the original). The brief
and reply brief comprise 172 pages. [hereinafter Brief of Attorney GeneralJ.
178. Asserting that selective prosecution or selective enforcement claims are inconsistent with the presumptive validity of prosecutorial discretion, the state insisted that the
defendants making such claims have a heavy burden of proof to overcome the presumption. In support of its position, the state cited United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456
(1996). The state underscored the near impossibility of overturning a prosecutorial decision by stating that "[b]efore Armstrong, there had not been a single reported federal case
of a dismissal for race-based selective prosecution since 1886, when the Supreme Court
reversed the conviction of a Chinese laundry operator in Yick Wo v.Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886)." Brief of Attorney General,supra at 177, at 34-35 (the quote was from David Cole,
See No Evil Hear No Evil, 145 N.J. L.J. 844, August 26, 1996 - with emphasis added).

179. Brief of Attorney General,supra note 177, at 64, 87. The state argued that to prove
discriminatory effect the defendants were required to prove both elements under the law
established by the Supreme Court in United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996). The

requirements were apparently extrapolated from the Court's statement that "[tlo establish
a discriminatory effect in a race case the claimant must show that similarly situated individuals of a different race were not prosecuted." Id. at 1487.
180. Brief of Attorney General, supra note 177, at 97.
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gued that discriminatory purpose could be established only with "tangible affirmative evidence clearly demonstrating [the state agency's]
actual and active support for the discriminatory action in question" 181
and that it could not simply be inferred from the existence of disproportionate impact.182
Racial profiling became an incendiary political issue in 1998 when
New Jersey state troopers stopped four unarmed non-white men traveling on the turnpike to a basketball game and, following an altercation, shot the group 11 times. The incident triggered an investigation
by the United States Department of Justice who, in turn, threatened
the state with litigation to enforce the federal civil rights laws. Forced
into a corner, the state finally investigated the alleged discriminatory
law enforcement policies and procedures, and produced an interim report that conceded that racial profiling was "real-not imagined" in the
state of New Jersey. 183 The report not only found "willful misconduct
by a small number of state police members" but also "more common
instances of possible de facto discrimination by officers who may be
influenced by stereotypes and may thus tend to treat minority motorists differently during the course of routine traffic stops, subjecting
them more routinely to investigative tactics and techniques that are
designed to ferret out illicit drugs and weapons."''
The report,
though written in somewhat circumlocutory language and "legalistic
tone"' 8 5 and presented in conjunction with the release of the final report, forced the Governor to admit that racial and gender discrimina8 6
tion permeated the state police department.1
181. Id. at 105-106. The state claimed that the state agency cannot be held accountable
simply because it is alleged to have knowledge of the profiling.

182. Id. at 90. The state cited Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing

Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 ("Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, [364 U.S. 339 (1960)] or Yick Wo v. Hopkins, [118 U.S. 356 (1886)], impact alone
is not determinative and the Court must look to other evidence.").
183. Interim Report of the State Police Team RegardingAllegations of Racial Profiling,

presented by the Attorney General of New Jersey on April 20, 1999 [hereinafter The
Report].

184. Id.at 7.
185. Civil rights leaders, though heartened by the state's admission of discrimination,
wanted the report to document the "pervasive and systemic" "culture of racism" of state
troopers. David Herszenhorn, Reversal Has Some Questioning Attorney General's Mo-

tives, N.Y. TnIEs, April 21, 1999, at B8.
186. See David Kocieniewski, Bias Permeates the State Police, Whitman Admits, N.Y.

Tnms, July 3, 1999, at Al (the Governor's admission came at the heels of the Attorney
General's final report on racial profiling. Blacks and Hispanics make up 14% and women
3% of the state's 2,700-member police force. The report showed that the minorities and
women on the force are often subjected to discrimination and harassment that resulted in a
number of lawsuits). In March 1999, the Governor dismissed the Chief of the State Police
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As a result of the state's admission of racial profiling, the state
attorney general withdrew the state's appeal pending in the Superior
Court. Absent the state's confession, the victims of racial profiling
would have little chance of proving the requisite purposeful discrimination, and their own complaint would likely languish in state and federal courts for many more years. It should be noted that the state's
investigative reports steadfastly maintain that the state drug and narcotics laws and policies are neutral and the racial profiling was simply
a matter of unfortunate coincidence. Nevertheless, the state rightly
acknowledged in its report that the effect of racially disparate treatment "whether obvious or subtle, or intentional or not, is to engender
feelings of fear, resentment, hostility, and mistrust by minority citizens."'" The fact remains that the Davis rule of the U.S. Supreme
Court plays a significant role in perpetuating such effects in New
Jersey and across the country.' 8
V.
A.

First Amendment Neutrality

Gems in the Backyard

To learn about the complex dimensions and intricacies of neutrality, we need not look beyond the contours of the Supreme Court's
First Amendment jurisprudence. The concept of neutrality is firmly
embedded in the prevailing doctrinal formulations of the Court both
under the Free Speech and Religion Clauses. The experience gained
from the sustained and widespread application of neutrality to the
First Amendment provides invaluable insight into the inadequacies of
the Court's neutrality analysis under the Equal Protection Clause.
There is no sound justification for not using identical neutrality analysis for the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment. Not
only do the rights and liberties secured by both Amendments occupy
high positions on the scale of constitutional values, but the role of the
antidiscrimination principle-the principle underpinning neutrality
for making racially prejudicial remarks. See Whitman Dismisses State Police Chieffor Race
Remarks, N.Y. TIMEs, March 1, 1999, at Al.
187. The Report, supra note 183, at 7.
188. Recently some members of Congress proposed legislation to provide funds to
states to conduct investigations of alleged racial profiling. See Getting the Facts on Racial
Profiling, N.Y. TnIMs, June 11, 1999, at A32; H.R. 1443, 106th Cong. (1999). A bill to
provide for the collection of data on traffic stops was introduced in the 106th Congress, 1st
Session, on April 15, 1999 by Rep. John Conyers, Jr. of Michigan and 21 other co-sponsors.
President Clinton has already ordered investigation on suspected racial profiling by federal

agencies including customs, immigration and drug enforcement. See Steven A. Holmes,
Clinton Orders Investigation on Possible Racial Profiling,N.Y. Tnmms, June 10, 1999, at
A22.
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and safeguarding rights and liberties from governmental infringement-remains practically the same.
B.

Neutrality Under the Free Speech Clause

The Supreme Court's Free Speech jurisprudence is built on a con-

tent-based/content-neutral distinction. Content-based restrictions on
protected "high-value" 189 speech are strictly scrutinized and are generally held unconstitutional. 190 Content-neutral restrictions that limit
protected high-value speech "without regard to the content or com-

municative impact of the message conveyed" 191 are reviewed under a
variety of less stringent standards."9 The "operative core" 193 or the
"organizing principle" 194 of the Court's Free Speech jurisprudence is

the categorical requirement of content neutrality.
Since the Court assigned pivotal significance to content neutrality
it has encountered recurring problems in figuring out its precise meaning. The most telling statement the Court has made concerning this

problem is that "[d]eciding whether a particular regulation is content
189. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Neutral Restrictions,54 U. Cm. L. REv. 46, 48 (1987).
The Court's free speech jurisprudence is also premised on a division of all speech into
three categories. Some speech acts such as threats, bribes, wagering, price-fixing and criminal conspiracy are entirely outside the purview of the First Amendment. See Frederick
Schauer, Categoriesand the FirstAmendment A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REv. 265
(1981). All speech covered by the First Amendment is either protected or unprotected.
The general rule is that most speech covered by the First Amendment is protected. Some
rare species of speech such as obscenity and fighting words fall into the unprotected category. See Harry Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup.Or.REv. 1.
Recently, the Court in R.A.V. v. St Paul held that "fighting words" can be restricted only
on a content-neutral, nondiscriminatory basis. 505 U.S. 377, 403-404 (1992).
190. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (striking down a
state criminal statute that prohibited business corporations from making contributions or
expenditures to influence the outcome of a vote on any question submitted to voters on the
ground that the corporations have a First Amendment right to express views on issues of
public importance without proving that the issues affected the corporation's business); Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290
(1981) (holding that an ordinance placing limitation of $250 on contributions to committees formed to support or oppose ballot measures submitted to popular vote contavened
the First Amendment rights of association and expression).
191. Stone, supra note 189, at 48.
192. See id.On the other hand, content-based restrictions "limit communication because of the message it conveys." Id. at 47.
193. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First
Amendment The Dog that Didn'tBark, 1994 Su'. CT. Ruv. 1, 22 ("The master rule on
which judges and theorists predominantly converged was the requirement of content neutrality, conceived largely as the antithesis of ad hoc balancing of free speech interests on
the one hand against the interests favoring regulation on the other.").
194. Susan H. Williams, Content Discriminationand the FirstAmendment, 139 U. PA. L.
REv. 615, 617 (1991).
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based or content neutral is not always a simple task."'1 95 Frequently,

the Justices take diametrically opposite positions on the subject. Consider, for instance, the sharply divergent views of the Justices on neutrality in F.C.C.v. League of Women Voters of California.96 The issue
in the case was whether a federal statute that forbade "editorializing"
by "noncommercial educational broadcasting stations" that receive
federal grants through the Corporation for Public Broadcasting' 97 was
a law "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." 98 The
Court's majority, led by Justice Brennan, held that the statute's "ban
[was] defined solely on the basis of the content of the suppressed
speech"'199 and that the content-based regulation restricted speech
both in terms of viewpoints and the subject matter.2 ° The Court
found the law a "purest example" of a First Amendment violation.
Four Justices disagreed. Justice Rehnquist and two of his colleagues found Congress' prohibition on editorializing "strictly neutral."' 201 In their view, the prohibition had not singled out "editorial

views of one particular ideological bent"20 or prevented public stations from airing programs "dealing with controversial subjects so
long as [station] management itself does not expressly endorse a particular viewpoint. '2 3 They found nothing in the First Amendment
that made the law unconstitutional. Justice Stevens, in a separate dissent, found "greatest significance" 2° in the fact that "the statutory
restriction [was] completely neutral in its operation"205 in that it prohibited "all editorials without any distinction being drawn concerning
the subject matter or the point of view that might be expressed."20 6
195. Turner Broad. Sys. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
196. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
197. Public Broadcasting Amendments Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 977-35, 95 stat. 730
(1981).
198. U.S. CONsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press .... ").
199. F.C.C. v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 383 (1984).
200. See id. at 383-84. The Court found that the restriction was "specifically directed at
a form of speech - namely, the expression of editorial opinion-that lies at the heart of the
First Amendment protection." Id. at 381. The Court thought that in order to determine
whether a particular statement of station management constitutes "editorial" proscribed by
the law, enforcement authorities must examine the content of the message. See id. at 383.
201. Id. at 408 (Rehnquist, J., joined by the Chief Justice and Justice White, dissenting).
202. Id. at 407.
203. Id at 407-08. Justice Rehnquist also noted that "Congress has not prevented station management from communicating its own views on those subjects through any medium other than subsidized public broadcasting." Id. at 408.
204. Id. at 413 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
205. Id
206. Id.
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While the Justices in League of Women Voters fundamentally dis-

agreed over the meaning of government neutrality20 7 both the majority and the dissent sought to rationalize their respective positions by
spinning the facial language of the statute differently. In so doing, the
Justices engaged in a process of ad hoc balancing of the free speech/
free press interests on the one hand and the government's regulatory
interests on the other 2 8-the

very process the categorical rule of con-

tent neutrality was designed to avoid.2 "9 They did not resort to any
particular framework or inquiry that could help demarcate the content-based/content-neutral distinction.
There are indications that the Court has finally discarded this ad
hoc balancing and embraced a more sophisticated and predictable approach to the analysis of content neutrality. To determine content
neutrality, the Court is now willing to look beyond a law's facial neutrality or governmental assertions of neutral purpose to ascertain
"whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because
of [agreement or] disagreement with the message it conveys. '210 The
Court articulated its new method of analysis in Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. F.C.C.211 In this case, the Court decided the constitutionality of the "must-carry provisions" of a federal statute that required cable television systems to devote a portion of their channels to
the transmission of local broadcast television programs. 2
Designed to create a competitive balance between cable operators and over-the-air broadcast television stations, the must-carry pro207. Thaddeus J.Bums, Neutral-PrincipleTheory and FirstAmendment Adjudication,
24 MEM. ST. U.L. Rlv. 7, 15 (1993) (stating that in League of Women Voters the Justices
fundamentally disagreed over the definition of government neutrality).
208. By balancing, the majority found that while "Government's interest in ensuring
balanced coverage of the public issues is plainly both important and substantial," League
of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 378, the proscription on editorializing was "not sufficiently
tailored to the harms it seeks to prevent to justify its substantial interference with broadcasters' speech", id. at 392, which "has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy
of First Amendment values." Id. at 381.
On the other side, Justice Rehnquist found that the prohibition on editorializing was
just a condition attached to a federal subsidy. In his opinion, "the condition imposed has a
rational relationship to Congress' purpose in providing the subsidy", and "it is not primarily 'aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas."' Id. at 407.
209. See Fallon, supra note 193, at 22 (citing JoHN HART ELY, DEMOcRACY AND DisTRusT. A THEORY op JUDICIAL REvIEw 110-116 (1980)).

210. Turner Broad. Sys. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (citing Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
211. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
212. The "must-carry" provisions contained in sections 4 and 5 of the Cable Television
Consumer Protectionand Competition Act of 1992 were challenged on the ground that they
abridged the freedom of speech or of the press in violation of the First Amendment.
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visions challenged in the case were enacted by Congress as antitrust
and fair trade practice legislation. By requiring cable systems to set
aside a portion of their channels for local broadcasters, the must-carry
provisions burdened the speech interests of cable operators, while bestowing tangible competitive benefits on local broadcasters. The
Supreme Court agreed with the district court finding that the "mustcarry [provisions], on their face, impos[ed] burdens 2and
confer[red]
13
benefits without reference to the content of speech.

The Supreme Court refused to stop its inquiry on the basis of
mere facial neutrality, stating that "even a regulation neutral on its
face may be content based if its manifest purpose is to regulate speech
because of the message it conveys."'2 14 Accordingly, the Court proceeded to examine the design, scope and operation 1 5 of the contested
provisions and arrived at the conclusion that "the purposes underlying
[their] enactment.., are unrelated to the content of speech,

'2 16

and

that "[r]ather, they are meant to protect broadcast television from
what Congress determined to be unfair competition by cable systems. ' 217 The Court specifically ruled out any consideration of "alleged illicit legislative motive"2 8 as a factor in ascertaining the
purpose or determining the constitutionality of the legislation.219
C. Facial Neutrality and the Religion Clauses
Neutrality is not an isolated concept consigned to the Free
Speech Clause. By declaring that neither a state nor the federal government can favor one religion over another, or believers over nonbelievers,22 the Court has long made neutrality an inseparable part of
213. Turner BroadcastingSystem, 512 U.S. at 643.
214. Id. at 645 (opinion of the Court delivered by Justice Kennedy and joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, Stevens and Souter).
215. See id. at 647-49.
216. Id. at 647.
217. Id. at 652.
218. Id.
219. See id. (stating that the Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive, citing United States v. O'Brien, 391
U. S. 367, 391 (1968)).
220. The Court first articulated the neutrality concept in the context of the Establishment Clause, in Everson v. Board of Education,330 U.S. 1 (1947), stating "[n]either a state
nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another." Id. at 15. [The First]
Amendment requires the state to be neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary." Id. at 18. The
Court reaffirmed the neutrality requirement of the Establishment Clause in later cases.
See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va, 515 U.S. 819 (1995);
Agnosti v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). The Court imposed the requirement of neutrality
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the religion clauses. 221 The Court has come to recognize that "[a]
proper respect for both the Free Exercise and the Establishment
Clauses compels
the state to pursue a course of 'neutrality' toward
' 2
religion."

D.

The Establishment Clause

Neutrality serves as the mediating principle that maintains the
balance between the competing demands of the religion clauses. The
reconciliation of the proverbial conflict 2m between the Establishment
Clause that favors a wall of separation between church and state, and
the Free Exercise Clause that occasionally requires the state to accom-

modate religious interests and institutions in the administration of
public social welfare programs, necessitates neutral rules to govern
church-state relations

24

The conflict between the notions of state's

noninvolvement in religion and its obligation of impartiality toward
religion is also embedded in the Establishment Clause, as interpreted
under the Free Exercise Clause as well. See, e.g,. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.
v. City of Hialeah; 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
There is considerable disagreement among respected scholars as to whether the Establishment Clause erects an impenetrable wall of separation between the state and religion.
See, e.g., Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHi. L.
REv. 1, 46 (1961) ("[Ihe First Amendment prohibits... a subsidy where it is granted
because of the religious nature of the activity conducted."); Mark TUshnet, "Of Church and
State and the Supreme Court" Kurland Revisited, 1989 Sup. CT. REv. 373, 384 ("For Kurland, it went almost without saying that any sort of accommodation of religion as such [by
the state] was impermissible.").
In the opinion of Professor Cass R. Sunstein, the neutrality concept may be inconsistent with the Establishment Clause. "[T]he Constitution is not neutral as between religion
and non- religion. Under the establishment clause, the government is prohibited form benefitting religion, although benefits to others are perfectly acceptable." CAsS R. StuNsTEiN,
TIm PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 307 (1993).

221. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. .. ").
222. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696
(1994) (citing Committee for Public Ed. & Religions Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,792793 (1973)).
223. See Suzanna Sherry, Lee v. Weisman: Paradox Redux, 1992 Sup. CT. RFrv. 123,
147, 149 ("[I]t is not possible simultaneously to implement the core values of both religion
clauses .... The time has come to admit the conflict and to make an honest choice.").
224. See Abner S. Greene, The PoliticalBalance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE LJ.
1611, 1663 (1993) (suggesting that in order to treat religion fairly, the courts need to balance the burden imposed by the Establishment Clause on religion with the treatment
favoring religion under the Free Exercise Clause); Jesse H. Choper, The Free Exercise
Clause: A StructuralOverview and an Appraisal of Recent Developments, 27 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 943 (1986) (stating that the Court, while holding a law unconstitutional if its purpose is to aid religion under the Establishment Clause, should at times require the state to
aid religion under the Free Exercise Clause).
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by the Supreme Court.225 The conflict quite frequently and most noticeably manifests itself in cases involving governmental aid to education. The permissible limit of governmental assistance to sectarian
institutions under the neutrality mandate of the Establishment Clause
has been a recurrent issue. After years of inconsistent and ambiguous
decisions, 26 the Court finally, in Lemon v. Kurtzman,227 articulated a
three-part test to evaluate claims under the Establishment Clause.
Under the Lemon test, in order to survive an Establishment
Clause challenge, a state law should have three attributes: "First, the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion.. .; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government
entanglement with religion."' 2 Even though the Lemon test does
not directly speak of neutrality, the test is built on prior cases that
emphasize neutrality ' 9 and, in substance, it "retained the centrality of
neutrality in Establishment Clause doctrine." 0
225. The conflict was highlighted in Everson v Board of Education,330 U.S. 1 (1947),
the first case decided under the Establishment Clause. The case involved a challenge to a
resolution of a New Jersey township providing for the transportation of pupils to both
public and parochial schools. Justice Black's majority opinion for the Court stressed that
the Establishment Clause "was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between the Church
and State,"' but went on to uphold the transportation program to parochial schools to
make sure that the Court did "not inadvertently prohibit New Jersey from extending its
general state law benefits to all its citizens without regard to their religious belief." Id. at
16. Justice Black further stated: "That Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its
relations with believers ... and non-believers." Id. at 18. Five years after Everson, the
Court unambiguously articulated the state's obligation to accommodate the needs of students of religious institution. In Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), the Court approved a New York City program which gave "release time" to students of public schools
to allow them to attend religious instructions outside of the school building, holding that
government encouragement of religious instruction in cooperation with religious institutions did not violate the Establishment Clause because such accommodation of the students' "spiritual needs" followed "the best of our tradition," and avoided the showing of "a
callous indifference to religious groups." Id. at 314.
226. See DANIEL A. FARBER, THE Fmsr AME ,DVmENT 268 (1998) (stating that in the 20
years after Everson the Court oscillated between the ideal of strict separation of church
and state, and the ideal of accommodation of religious institutions and interests).
227. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Applying the three-part test, the Court invalidated two state
laws that provided partial funding for teacher salaries at parochial schools.
228. Id. at 612-613.
229. The Lemon test relied heavily on two cases that extensively subscribed to the neutrality concept: Abington School Districtv. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), and Waltz v. Tax
Commissioner,397 U.S. 664 (1970), even though the Lemon case itself referred to neutrality only in passing.
230. John T. Valauri, The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48
Prrr. L. REv. 83, 130 (1986) (also stating that "[a]Ithough Lemon mentioned neutrality
only briefly, it nevertheless embodied the conceptual structure and problems of
neutrality").
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Despite the Justices' disagreement about its operational details,
sometimes to the extent of leading them to opposite results, the
Lemon test has endured as the Supreme Court's formula for deciding
Establishment Clause cases. The Court continues to inquire whether
the government, in allocating aid purportedly on the basis of neutral,
secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion and in making
funds available to both secular and religious educational institutions,
acted with the purpose of advancing or inhibiting religion or whether
the aid has the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.23 1 The Court
will examine the purpose and effect of the aid program in excruciating
detail even when the program is described as neutral. In the words of
Justice Souter, "[i]f a scheme of government aid results in support for
religion in some substantial degree, or in endorsement of its value, the
formal neutrality of the scheme does not render the Establishment

Clause helpless .... ,232
The Supreme Court consistently recognizes that the Establishment Clause will not permit a state "to hide behind" a law neutral in
form and "remain studiously oblivious to [its] effects. ' ' 1 3 If the challenged governmental law or action does not involve direct or indirect
public funding to private religious schools, determining neutrality will
not be an easy task. Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School
Districtv. Grumetl

4

is a case on point. The case involved a New York

law that created a public school district for the village of Kiryas Joel,
231. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1997) (stating that the Court continues to adhere to the Lemon test to inquire "whether the government acted with the purpose of advancing or inhibiting religion" and "whether the aid has the 'effect' of advancing
or inhibiting religion"). The majority in Agostini used three primary criteria "to evaluate
whether government aid has the effect of advancing religion: [1)] it does not result in government indoctrination; [2) it does not] define its recipients by reference to religion; and
[3) it does not] create an excessive entanglement." Id. at 234. In Agostini, the majority
opinion written by Justice O'Connor upheld a federally funded program providing supplemental, remedial instruction to disadvantaged children on a neutralbasis even though the
instruction was given in sectarian school premises by government employees pursuant to a

program containing safeguards. See id. at 2016. Four dissenting justices found that the aid
constituted direct state aid to religious institutions and thus, violated "the Establishment
Clause's central prohibition against religious subsidies by the government." Id. at 241.
The dissenters also used the Lemon test in their analysis.
232. Id. at 253 (Souter, J., joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, and Breyer in part,
dissenting).
233. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 777 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, concurring in part and concurring in
judgment); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,878 (1995)
(Souter, J., joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, dissenting).
234. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
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populated exclusively by the Satmar Hasidic sect. 23 5 Satmar parents,
for religious reasons, refused to send children outside their village to
receive special educational services provided under the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The Supreme Court
prohibited New York from providing IDEA services to Satmar children on their religious school premises." 6 As a result, the creation of

a special public school district became the only alternative to accommodate the needs of the Satmar children. The school district, like any
other in the state of New York, was to be "under the control of a
board of education" elected by the voters of the village of Kiryas
Joel." 7 The law that created the Kiryas Joel school district was then

challenged as an unconstitutional establishment of religion. Applying
the Lemon test, the state courts found the law unconstitutional.

Affirming the lower courts, the U.S. Supreme Court, by a six to
three majority, held that the statute "fail[ed] the test of neutrality" 8
because it allocated civil authority to the school district using a "religious criterion." 9 Since the boundaries of the public school district
coincided with those of the village of Kiryas Joel, the enclave of the
Satmar sect, the Justices found the creation of the district tantamount

to allocation of political power to a religious community with no assurance that the governmental authority would be exercised in a religiously neutral way.24 The fact that "New York allows virtually any
group of residents to incorporate their own village, with broad powers
of self-government"'24 did not make the law neutral or non-discrimi235. The Satmar Hasidic sect practices a strict form of Judaism. The members of the
sect refuse to follow the way of living of the rest of society, and strictly guard against
assimilating into it. "They interpret the Torah strictly; segregate the sexes outside the
home; speak Yiddish as their primary language; eschew television, radio and English language publications; and dress in distinctive ways that include head coverings and special
garments for boys and modest dresses for girls. Children are educated in private religious
schools ...[where] most boys receive... limited exposure to secular objects and most girls
[are prepared at their special schools] for their roles as wives and mothers." ld. at 691.
236. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); see also School Dist. of Grand Rapids v.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (holding that providing public funding to classes held on religious
school premises violate the Establishment Clause).
237. 512 U.S. 687, 693 (1994) (citing 1989 N.Y. Laws, ch. 478).
238. Kiryas Joel Village, 512 U.S. at 709. The substantive portions of Justice Souter's
opinion for the Court were joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor and Ginsburg
who all wrote concurring opinions. Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurring opinion
in which he maintained that the law drew political boundaries by using a religious criterion.
See id. at 728. Justice O'Connor found a "legislative drawn religious classification" in the
law. Id. at 716.
239. Id at 702.
240. See id. at 703.
241. Id at 712 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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natory. The uncertainty and unpredictability of similarly situated
groups seeking incorporation of special villages, and the unreviewability of a legislature's failure to enact a special law in the future,' 2 further influenced the Supreme Court's decision.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist, wrote a scathing dissent. Justice Scalia asserted the school to be
a public school specifically designed to provide a public secular education to handicapped students who happened to share the same religion. In his opinion, the majority decision was based on the "novel
proposition" that any group of residents of New York "can be invested with political power, but not if they all belong to the same religion.1243 Justice Scalia insisted that the law that created the school
district was "facially neutral" and that it could not be invalidated without first showing that "the legislators were aware that religion caused
the problem addressed and that the legislature's proposed solution
was motivated by a desire to disadvantage or benefit a religious group
(i.e., to disadvantage or benefit them because of their religion)."2 4 In
his view, the law was facially neutral because it extended educational
benefits to one area of the state where it was not effectively distributed, regardless of whether the reason 2for
the ineffective distribution
45
religion.
Satmar
the
to
could be traced
It is reassuring that six Justices of the Court declined Justice
Scalia's invitation to become fiction writers. It would have been utterly unrealistic for the Court to rule that a special law enacted for the
specific purpose of bestowing autonomous governmental authority to
a religious sect with no reliable safeguards against religious favoritism
was neutral simply because the law was phrased in neutral terms. Justice Scalia agreed with Justice Souter that the boundaries of Ki.ryas
Joel village were drawn at the time of incorporation "so as to exclude
all but Satmars ' 246 and that the special school district coincided with

242. See id. at 703.
243. Id at 736 (Scalia, J., joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas, dissenting).
244. Id.at 738, 741.
245. See id. at 741. Justice Scalia, invoking analogy from an Equal Protection case that
held "facially race-neutral laws can be invalidated on the basis of their effects only if 'unexplainable on grounds other than race,"' asserted that the special school district law cannot
be invalidated on the "mere basis of its asserted religiously preferential (or discriminatory)
effects." Id. at 738 (citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)). In effect, Justice Scalia rejected the Lemon test of purpose and

effect.
246. Id.at 742-43.
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the village boundaries.2 4 7 In Justice Scalia's opinion, both the village

and the school district were created to meet the "distinctive secular
needs or desires of citizens who happened to be Satmars. '248 The exclusive village and school district were created solely to seclude the
Satmar for religious reasons. Therefore, it would be a remarkable
stretch to say, paraphrasing Justice Scalia, that the laws were created
to meet the secular needs and desires of Satmars as citizens.
Justice Scalia's main argument in favor of the law that created the
special school district is that it is a facially neutral law deserving a
strong presumption of validity "because the law involves no public aid
to private schools and does not mention religion."249 Under that presumption, the law cannot be invalidated without showing that it was
"motivated by a desire to disadvantage or benefit a religious
group."" 0 Justice Scalia's theory, as applied to the special school district, is riddled with serious contradictions. First, it is clear that,
notwithstanding the avoidance of religious reference on the surface,
the special school district law was created to educate Satmar children
who were prevented from being educated elsewhere solely because of
their religion and religious way of life. Second, if a facially neutral law
can be invalidated on a showing that it was motivated to benefit a
religious group, a showing of that sort was clearly made in the Satmar
case. Justice Scalia, for instance, spent several pages arguing that the
law should have been considered a permissible religious accommodation under the religion clauses. "When a legislature acts to accommodate religion, particularly a minority sect," he stated, "it follows the
best of our traditions.""'51 To "accommodate" means "to do a favor
or service for" according to the American Heritage Dictionary.5 2
The school district law specifically designed to accommodate and benefit a religious sect should, therefore, be invalid under Justice Scalia's
facial neutrality theory. Finally, Justice Scalia's radical and divergent
247. See id. at 742 ("Whether or not the reason for the ineffective distribution had anything to do with religion, it is a remarkable stretch to say that the Act was motivated by a
desire to favor or disfavor a particular religious group.").
248. Md.Quoting Justice Souter's statement that "[i]t is undisputed that those who negotiated the village boundaries when applying the general village incorporation statute
drew them so as to exclude all but Satmars," id. at 699, Justice Scalia simply stated: "It is
indeed." He then went on to say that there was a secular reason to support the boundarydrawing. Id. at 742-743.
249. Id. at 752.
250. Id. at 741.
251. Id. at 744 (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)). He also cited Art
VI, cl. 3 of the U.S. Constitution to point out that the "Constitution itself contains an
accommodation of sorts." Id.

252.

AMERICAN HFRTAGE DiCioNARY

62 (2d College ed. 1982).
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decision in Employment Division v. Smith,153 in which he formulated
the restrictive theory of facial neutrality, has considerably diminished
the judicial protection of the rights of minority religious sects. Scalia's
solicitude for the Satmar religious sect, though commendable, is therefore not convincingly neutral. The majority made the no-nonsense argument that the special school district law failed the neutrality test of
the religion clauses by crossing the line from permissible accommodation to impermissible establishment. Nothing that Justice Scalia stated
either factually or logically refuted the majority's objective finding.
The Supreme Court's conclusion that the Kiryas Joel Village
School District failed the Establishment Clauses's test of neutrality
was supported by five Justices. 54 The Justices, however, failed to
reach consensus as to the role that the Lemon test played in reaching
that result. While Justice Blackmun wrote a concurring opinion to
emphasize "the general validity of the basic principles stated in
Lemon,"''z 5 Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion pointed out that
the Establishment Clause cases fall into different categories seldom
amenable to any one grand unitary test and that there is a need to
evolve varied approaches by freeing the case law "from the Lemon
test's rigid influence." 6 The three dissenting Justices maintained that
the Lemon test was "utterly meaningless" in much of its application,
and that there were sound reasons for its abandonment. 7 In spite of
all the misgivings, Justice Blackmun was emphatic that Justice Souter's plurality opinion was based on the analysis under the second (primary effect) and third (entanglement) prongs of the Lemon test.y s
Despite the recurrent internal disagreements, the Court seems to
hang on to the Lemon test, presumably because of the difficulty in
253. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Justice Scalia's majority opinion rejected established precedents and held that a generally applicable facially neutral law having a disproportionate
impact on religious minorities need not be justified by the state by showing a "compelling
interest" unless the law is motivated by an intent to discriminate. Congress overruled the
Court by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000 bb et seq., which required the Court to reinstate the compelling interest test. The
Court invalidated RFRA on 14th Amendment grounds.
254. Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, and Ginsburg agreed with the plurality
opinion of Justice Souter on the neutrality issue.
255. Kiryas Joel Village, 512 U.S. at 710 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
256. Id. at 721 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
257. Id at 751 (Scalia, J., joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas, dissenting).
Justice Scalia is an ardent critic of the Lemon test. He once stated that the test is a "ghoul
in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after
being repeatedly killed and buried." Lamb's Chapel v. Center Monriches Union Free Sch.
Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 397-401 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
258. See 512 U.S. at 710 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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The Kiryas Joel Village case demonstrates,

however, that the Lemon test is analytically incoherent with respect to
the specific issue of Establishment Clause neutrality when state aid to
religion involves no public funding. The test is obviously inappropriate, and the test's entanglement prong even irrelevant to the adjudication of claims of state animosity and discrimination against minority
religion under the Free Exercise Clause.26 ° The neutrality issues that
arise in the context of such claims have more to do with selection of
the standard of judicial review than with the permissible dimensions
of church-state relations.
E. The Free Exercise Clause
Ever since the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division

v. Smith,2 61 the concept of neutrality has assumed a critical role in

Free Exercise jurisprudence. In that case, the Court, by a bare major-

ity, held that the Free Exercise Clause did not require Oregon to grant
Native American Church members an exemption from the state's
criminal drug laws for their sacramental use of peyote. The Court,
disregarding three decades of established precedent, 62 ruled that a
facially neutral law of general applicability need not be justified by a
compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental
259. The Court adhered to the Lemon test in its entirety in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S.
203 (1997). The majority opinion of Justice O'Connor was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Thomas and Kennedy. The dissenting opinion of Justice Souter
joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and in part by Breyer only disagreed with the majority for not applying the Lemon test in a way they thought correct and proper.
260. In contrast, Establishment Clause claims typically raise questions as to whether the
state has aided religion too little or too much in a way that effect a symbolic union of
church and state. The Lemon test effectively prevents such union from happening. See
John T. Valauri, The Concept of Neutrality in EstablishmentClause Doctrine, 48 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 83, 144 ("The total effect of the three Lemon prongs is to bar most aids and accommodations to religion.").
261. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
262. See Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer, Disposing of the Red Herrings: A Defense of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 69 SotrH CAL. L. Rv. 589, 602-03 (1996) ("[T]he
Court unraveled three decades of precedent which, for the most part, applied the compelling government interest test to free exercise claims-albeit with mixed results.").
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court held: "A regulation neutral on
its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for government neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion." Id. at 220. Justice
Scalia's majority opinion in Smith characterized cases like Yoder as "hybrid" decisions, but
Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion maintained that those cases were consistently considered "as part of the mainstream of our free exercise jurisprudence." Smith, 494 U.S. at
896 (O'Connor J, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, dissenting).
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effect of burdening a particular religious practice.263 Four dissenting
justices, led by Justice O'Connor, found "nothing talismanic about
neutral laws of general applicability... [because] laws neutral toward
religion can coerce a person to violate his religious conscience or intrude upon his religious duties just as effectively as laws aimed at religion." 2" The majority insisted that by permitting an individual to
escape from the obligation to obey neutral and generally applicable
laws based on his religious belief would make him "a law unto himself"-"a constitutional anomaly."265
While the Smith rule abruptly elevated the concepts of neutrality
and general applicability to a level that conferred constitutional sanctity on laws that burden free exercise of religion, the rule itself did not
define those concepts. Instead, the Court assumed that the concepts
are self-explanatory. Yet the Court's experience since the Smith case
has brought home the old warning that self-serving facial characterizations of law can be elusive and even misleading at times. In Church of
26 6 the challenged health
the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah,
and sanitary regulations of the city that had masqueraded as neutral
laws of general applicability failed to meet the requirements of the
Smith rule.2 67 As a result, the Court felt compelled to lay down a

framework for analyzing claims of neutrality and general applicability.
The impugned laws of the city of Hialeah prohibited the adherents of Santeria faith from performing their religious ritual of animal
sacrifice. The city insisted that the intent behind the sacrifice prohibition was to protect public health, peace and public morality, and was
enforceable against any and all who engaged in the practice of sacrifice. 268 When the laws were challenged by the members of the
Santeria religion under the Free Exercise Clause, the federal district
court found that the laws did not target religious conduct "on their
face"2 6 9 and that the laws' effect on the plaintiffs' religious conduct

was "'incidental to [their] secular purpose and effect"270 The District
Court found the city had four compelling interests in enacting the pro263. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 896 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Robin-Vergeer,
supra note 262, at 601 n.39.
264. Smith, 494 U.S. at 901 (O'Connor J, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun, dissenting).
265. Id. at 885-86 (majority opinion of Justice Scalia).
266. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
267. See id. at 531-32.
268. See id. at 535-36.
269. Id. at 529.
270. IM.at 529 (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723 F.
Supp. 1467, 1483-84 (S.D. Fla. 1988)).
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hibition: first, animal sacrifices presented a substantial health risk;
second, the practice was likely to inflict emotional injury to children
who witnessed it; third, and interest in protecting animals from cruel
and unnecessary killing; and fourth, the city's interest in restricting the
sacrifice of animals to areas zoned for slaughterhouse uses. 271 The
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision in a
one paragraph per curiam opinion.272 The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the challenged laws "fail[ed] to satisfy the Smith requirements" of neutrality and general applicability. 3
The Supreme Court summarily rejected the city's contention that
judicial "inquiry must end with the text of the laws at issue," declaring
'
that "[f]acial neutrality is not determinative."274
The Court then established a framework to ascertain whether a law has met the quintessential requirements of neutrality and general applicability. The key
to the neutrality inquiry is to decipher the object or purpose of the
law. The Court emphasized that "if the object of a law is to infringe
upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law
is not neutral."'2 75 To determine the object of the law, the Court
would not only meticulously examine its text to discern language with
religious connotations,276 but also assess "the effect of [the] law in its
real operation."277 When a law implicates multiple concerns unrelated to religion, the object inquiry should ascertain whether the law
"proscribe[s] more religious conduct than is necessary to achieve [its]
stated ends."'2 78 Justices Kennedy and Stevens even suggested that the
Court could even resort to "an equal protection mode of analysis" to
determine any possible discriminatory object of a law "from both direct and circumstantial evidence." 279
271. See id. at 529-30.
272. See 936 F.2d 586 (1991).
273. 508 U.S. at 532 (plurality opinion of Justice Kennedy, joined by the Chief Justice
and Justices Scalia, Thomas and White).
274. Id. at 534.
275. Id. at 533 (citing Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990)).
276. See id. at 533-34. "To determine the object of a law, we must begin with its text, for
the minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its face. A law
lacks facial neutrality if it refers to a religious practice without a secular meaning discernable from the language or context." Id. at 533.
277. Id. at 535.
278. Id. at 538. The Court noted that the challenged laws of the city of Hialeah implicated multiple concerns unrelated to religious animosity, for example, cruelty to animals,
and health hazards from improper disposal. It found that the laws, when considered together, disclosed "an object remote from these legitmate concerns." Id. at 535.

279. Id. at 540.
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As a result of its thorough neutrality inquiry, the Court arrived at
the conclusion that the challenged laws of the city of Hialeah "had as
their object the suppression of religion" and, therefore, were not neutral . 0 The inquiry led the Court to find that the facially neutral laws
"were gerrymandered with care to proscribe religious killings of animals but to exclude almost all secular killings," and that they sup-

pressed much more religious conduct than was necessary to achieve
the asserted legitimate interests of the city.281 The Court also made
the additional inquiry into the overlapping concept of general applicability2 and found that the laws were "underinclusive" since they tried
to advance the city's interests in protecting public health and preventing cruelty to animals solely by prohibiting religious practices of
Santeria believers, instead of imposing the prohibition on the society

as a whole. 283 Having found the challenged religion-burdening laws of
the city wanting neutrality and general applicability, the Court ruled

that they "must undergo the most rigorous scrutiny"' and be justified by showing that they were measures narrowly tailored to achieve
"'interests of the highest order.""'
The City of Hialeah case is refreshing because it offers a sche-

matic framework to analyze claims of neutrality for religion-burdening laws.

The framework permits the courts to examine the

substratum of facially neutral laws to ascertain their true object and
the laws' operational effect on the free exercise of religion. According
to the plurality opinion of Justice Kennedy, the neutrality inquiry
could even extend to the subjective motivation of the lawmakers. 286
Significantly, the entire neutrality inquiry precedes the decision on the
standard of constitutional review. The government interested in
280. Id. (citing Personnel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), a case concerning facial neutrality and the Equal Protection Clause, Justice Kennedy stated that objective factors such as historical background, legislative and administrative history, and
statements made by decisionmaking bodies, might bear on the question of discriminatory
object). Thus, it is clear that by "object" or "purpose", Justice Kennedy meant "intent" or
"motivation."
281. Id. at 542.
282. Justice Scalia and the Chief Justice expressed their willingness to "frankly acknowledge" that the terms neutrality and general applicability "substantially overlap."
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 557 (Scalia, J., joined bythe Chief Justice, concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
283. See id. at 543. In addition, the Court found a pattern of hostility toward the
Santeria religion from a variety of actions and statements of the city and members of the
city council. See id. at 541.
284. Id. at 546. This holding was supported by seven Justices.
285. Id.
286. See i.at 543-46 (citing McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 (1978), and Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972)).
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avoiding strict judicial scrutiny should, therefore, shoulder the entire
burden of establishing the neutrality of the challenged facially neutral,
religion-burdening law.
F. The New Doctrinal TWins
The in-depth judicial inquiry into the substance of facial neutrality in the City of Hialeah case was more than a matter of simple logic
and common sense. The inquiry was dictated by the Supreme Court's
constitutional responsibility to safeguard individual rights and liberties
from the threat of governmental action. The Justices would have abdicated that responsibility had the Court accepted the city's claim of
neutrality at its face value. The Court's obligation to explore beyond
surface neutrality would not have been materially different if it was
presented with facially neutral laws that impacted adversely on a racial group rather than a religious group. Similarly, the inquiry would
not be different if the case for adjudication was framed as a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause, rather than a violation of the Free
Exercise Clause. The proposition that the schematic analysis of facial
neutrality is easily transferable from the Free Exercise Clause to the
Equal Protection Clause does not rest entirely on deductive reasoning. The proposition stems directly from the Court's emerging analytical approach that assigns identical scope to the Free Exercise and the
Equal Protection Clauses.
The idea that the two clauses should be treated similarly has been
afloat for several decades. Starting in the early 1960s, a few constitutional law theorists began articulating the doctrinal similarity between
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Prominent among the scholars, Professor Philip Kurland suggested that the "freedom and separation clauses [of the First Amendment] should be read as a single
precept that the government cannot" use a "classification in terms of
religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden." 7 Under
the Kurland concept, the Religion Clauses, just like the Equal Protection Clause, require the government to pursue a policy of non-discrimination, namely a policy of total neutrality in matters of religion.
Stated more succinctly by another theorist, Leo Pfeffer, "the [F]irst
[A]mendment requires government to be 'religion-blind' as the
[F]ourteenth requires it to be colorblind." 2ss
The non-discrimination or neutrality principle has been widely
criticized as a misguided concept that would eviscerate or emasculate
287. Philip B. Kurland, supra note 220, at 6.
288. Leo Pfeffer, Religion-Blind Government, 15 STAN. L. REv. 389, 392 (1963).
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the Free Exercise Clause. 28 9 The Supreme Court appeared to consider the principle inapposite to the ideals of the Free Exercise Clause,
at least until it abruptly changed course in Employment Division v.
Smith.2" Prior to the Smith decision, the Court consistently read the
clause as permitting, and sometimes requiring, the government to accommodate religious practices. 291 Under the standard of constitutional scrutiny that the Court "painstakingly" developed over the
years, a state statute that burdens the free exercise of religion or a
state's refusal to grant a religious exemption must be "justified by a
compelling interest that cannot be served by less restrictive means." 2"
Yet the very idea of accommodation is the antithesis of neutrality.
Accommodation negates neutrality because accommodation requires
disparate treatment. Therefore, at least conceptually, neutrality and
accommodation are mutually exclusive. The law of employment discrimination is rife with graphic illustrations of the inherent contradiction between accommodation and neutrality or non-discrimination.2 93
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from
making discriminatory employment decisions on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex or national origin. 2 94 The prohibition has been interpreted as requiring employers to "neutrally"2 95 adopt employment
policies and workplace rules. In 1972, Congress amended the statute
289. See Stephen Pepper, Reynold, Yoder and Beyond: Alternatives for the Free Exercise Clause, 1981 UTAH L. REv. 309, 347 (the "primary weaknesses [of the nondiscrimination principle] are an absence of support in the text or history of the clauses and its
evisceration of the free exercise clause"); Gail Merel, The Protection of Individual Choice:
A Consistent Understandingof Religion Under the FirstAmendment, 45 U. Cm. L. REv.
805, 808-09 (1978) (the coherence and simplicity that the Kurland principle of neutrality

seeks to bring to the religion-clause doctrine can be achieved "only at a cost of almost total
emasculation of the free exercise provision").
290. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
291. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136,144-145
(1987) ("[G]overnment may (and sometimes must) accommodate religious practices
and... it may do so without violating the Establishment Clause.").
292. Smith, 494 U.S. at 907 (Blackmun, J., joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
dissenting). "This Court over the years painstakingly has developed a consistent and exacting standard to test the constitutionality of a state statute that burdens the free exercise of
religion." Id (citing Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 732
(1986); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,257-58 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S.
707, 718 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972); and Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 406 (1963)).
293. For a comprehensive discussion of the contradiction, see Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failureof the Religious Accommodation Provision to Redeem Title

VII, 76 Tnx. L. REv. 317 (1997).
294. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
295. Engle, supra note 293, at 320.
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to require employers to "reasonably accommodate" religious practices
and observances of employees unless such accommodation imposes
"undue hardship" on the employer's business. 296 Thus, by allowing
preferential treatment on religious grounds, Title VII now mandates
occasional departures from the neutrality principle.
Despite the unambiguous statutory directive, Courts tend to nullify the accommodation duty of employers by means of an extremely
restrictive interpretation of "undue hardship." In TWA v. Hardison,297 the Supreme Court seemed to uphold neutrality at the expense
of religious accommodation. In that case, employee Hardison was not
permitted to take Saturday off for observance of Sabbath as required
by his religion, the Worldwide Church of God. The employer maintained that Hardison was ineligible for the privilege under the seniority system contained in a collective-bargaining agreement.
Emphasizing that the paramount purpose of Title VII was the elimination of discrimination in employment, the Court expressed its preference for the employer's allocation of the burdens of weekend work
according to criteria established by a "neutral" seniority system over
the allocation of "days off in accordance with the religious needs of its
'
employees."298
In Hardison,the Court held that the results of the latter system discriminated against other employees who may have
strong non-religious reasons for not working on weekends. 99 In order to provide a statutory basis for its holding, the Court stated that
"[t]o require TWA to bear more than a de minimus cost in order to
give Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hardship." 3°°
In the sphere of public employment, the Supreme Court seems to
conflate religious accommodation and equal treatment. Public employers who are subject to legal obligations both under Title VII and
the Free Exercise Clause need not show any undue hardship to justify
failure to provide religious accommodation if the failure is based on a
neutral or non-discriminatory employment policy. The maintenance
of a neutral policy constitutes "reasonable accommodation." In Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook,3 1 for instance, the Court
found that the school board's refusal, consistent with its collective296. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, §2(7) 86
Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994)).
297. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
298. Id. 80-81.
299. See id. at 81. The Court added that "Title VII does not contemplate such unequal
treatment." Id.
300. Id. at 84.
301. 479 U.S. 60 (1986).
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bargaining agreement with the teachers' union, to grant three days of
paid leave for religious observance to a teacher was reasonable
enough to satisfy the board's accommodation obligation because the
law "did not impose a duty on the employer to accommodate at all
3 °2

costs.11

The Court's commitment to the non-discrimination principle
rather than to religious accommodation was explicit in Justice Steven's
concurring opinion. He noted that plaintiff Philbrook did not contend
that he received fewer days of paid leave than members of other religious faith or than teachers who had no religious obligations on school
days. Rather, Philbrook's argument was that the available six-day
paid leave was inadequate to serve his mandated religious observances while the same leave was quite adequate for teachers with no or
different religious commitments. According to Justice Stevens, Philbrook's argument rested on the premise that "[his] special, that is, religious, needs entitle him to extraordinary treatment" and, therefore, it
stated a "grievance against equal treatment rather than a claim that he
has been the recipient of unequal treatment.13 0 3 Justice Stevens
clearly equated religious accommodation with preferential treatment-a violation of the non-discrimination principle.
The lower courts interpreted the Supreme Court's statements requiring an employer to bear more than a de minimis accommodation
but less than accommodation at all costs, as a signal to get rid of the
accommodation obligation in its entirety. The Third Circuit adopted
this approach in United States v. Board of Education for the School
Districtof Philadelphia.3° In the case, the court held that the school
board and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania had no duty to accommodate a Muslim teacher by allowing her to wear religious attire in
the classroom in violation of the state garb statute. 30 5 The district
court found that "anti-Catholicism was a significant factor in the pas302. 1&I at 70 (citing TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977)). The Court remanded the
case for a decision as to whether the collective bargaining agreement could be construed to
allow Philbrook to use "personal business leave" for religious purposes. See id.
303. Id. at 79 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
304. 911 F.2d 882 (3rd Cir. 1990).
305. See id. at 885. The Garb Statute, enacted in 1895 as Public Law No. 282 provided:
[N]o teacher in any public school shall wear in said school or while engaged in the
performance of his duty as such teacher any dress, mark, emblem or insignia indicating the fact that such teacher is a member or adherent of any religious order,
sect or denomination.
Id. Violation of the statute would disqualify the teacher from teaching and subject the
school official to a misdemeanor charge which upon conviction would entail fines and loss
of the official's job. Id.
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sage of the [Garb Statute] of 1895. "306 The appeals court disregarded
the alleged impermissible motivation behind the statute as irrelevant
since it "bans all religious attire and is being enforced in a non-discriminatory manner with respect to the Muslim teachers as well as
Catholics."3 °7 The EEOC decided that the discharge of the teacher
for not complying with the Garb Statute constituted a violation of Title VII 0 1 The U.S. Department of Justice argued that the statute was
repugnant to Title VII and the Free Exercise Clause. 30 9 The court
concluded that accommodating the teacher's desire to wear religious
attire would be "a significant threat to the maintenance of religious
neutrality in the public school system" and that, regardless of the ultimate validity of the Garb Statute, requiring the school board to litigate over the motivation behind the statute "would itself constitute an
undue hardship. ' 310 The court dutifully applied the law established by
the Supreme Court in Hardison and Philbrook.
What the employment discrimination cases demonstrate is that,
under the prevailing ideology of the Supreme Court, it is extremely
difficult for the concepts of neutrality and accommodation to co-exist.
The obligation to accommodate is automatically fulfilled by maintaining relevant neutral employment policies that do not discriminate
against any religion. Under this reasoning, any religious accommodation may constitute an impermissible preference in violation of the
neutrality principle.
The Supreme Court's current Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence
is premised on the same kind of logic and reasoning. By declaring in
Employment Division v. Smith312 that "a law that is neutral and of
general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a
particular religious practice,131 3 the Court has categorically espoused
the neutrality principle at the expense of the doctrine of religious ac306. School Dist of Philadelphia,911 F.2d at 893.

307. Id.at 894.
308. See id. at 885.
309. See id.

310. Id. The Third Circuit applied the Oregon Supreme Court decision in Cooper v.
Eugene School District,723 P.2d 298 (Or. 1986), appeal dismissed, 480 U.S. 942 (1987), in

which a law identical to the Pennsylvania Garb Statute was upheld on the ground that it
was "narrowly tailored to the compelling state interest in preserving the appearance of
religious neutrality in public schools," even though the law imposed burdens on free exercise rights. School Dist. of Philadelphia,911 F.2d at 888.
311. See School Dist of Philadelphia,911 F.2d at 886.

312. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
313. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531
(1993) (citing Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
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commodation. By doing so, the Court "dramatically depart[ed] from
well-settled First Amendment jurisprudence, '3 14 which mandated that
governmental actions having the effect of substantially burdening a
religious practice be justified by a compelling governmental interest.31 5 Smith also marked the first time that the Court accepted the
Kurland theory of First Amendment neutrality, which disfavored
mandatory accommodation of exemption of activities solely motivated
by religious belief from the operation of generally applicable and
facially neutral laws.31 6 The decision certainly pacified those Kurland
disciples who consider religious accommodation a form of "affirmative action" seeking equality of result rather than equality of
31 7
treatment.
There can be no disagreement with Justice Blackmun's assertion
that the Smith decision "treated the Free Exercise Clause as no more
than an antidiscriminationprinciple,'' 31 8 even if one differs with his

complaint that "it ignored the value of religious freedom as an affirmative individual liberty."3 19 The decision effectively narrowed, if not
eliminated, the doctrinal disparity between the Free Exercise Clause
and the Equal Protection Clause. The Smith rule is cloned from the
rule of Washington v. Davis,32 which held that race-neutral laws that

have the effect of disproportionately disadvantaging racial minorities
need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest under the
Equal Protection Clause. The Smith Court announced this historic

doctrinal integration of the two Clauses, stating that "[j]ust as we subject to the most exacting scrutiny laws that make classifications based
on race ...

so too we strictly scrutinize governmental classifications
21

based on religion."

3

314. Smith, 494 U.S. at 891 (O'Connor, J., joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun in part, concurring with judgment).
315. This rule of accommodation was established through a series of established precedents. Most prominent among them are: Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); and Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind Employment Security
Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
316. See Tushnet, supra note 220, at 402. Tushnet stated: "Under contemporary cir-

cumstances, there is little reason to believe that the Court will, though it should, adopt
Kurland's approach." Id. One year after his prediction, the Smith case was decided.
317. See, e.g., David K. Dewolf, State Action under the Religious Clauses: Neutral in

Result or Neutral in Treatment?, 24 U. RicH. L. REv. 253 (1990). DeWolfs thesis is inspired by the Supreme Court's recent affirmative action cases decided under the Equal
Protection Clause.
318. City of IIialeah, 508 U.S. at 578 (emphasis added).
319. Id. (Blackmun, J., joined by Justice O'Connor, concurring in the judgment).
320. 426 U.S. 229, 242-48 (1976).
321. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 n.3 (internal cites omitted).
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The calibrated congruousness of the religion-blind Free Exercise
Clause and the color-blind Equal Protection Clause has been several
years in the making."
Further, the congruity has been intended to
achieve the goal of government neutrality in religious and racial matters. When placed on the monochromatic canvas of the Supreme
Court's prevailing jurisprudence, both religion-blindness and colorblindness can be seen as anti-affirmative action doctrines that bar
preferential treatment of religious and racial minorities. Now that
neutrality has been established as the core of the Free Exercise Clause
and the Equal Protection Clause, the Court's inquiry into the neutrality issue should be identical under both Clauses.
VI.

Conclusion

Equal protection neutrality is hopelessly adrift. Conceptually, it
is ambiguous, having no delineable structure or well defined meaning.
This conceptual ambiguity belies its pivotal role in the evolving jurisprudence of a colorblind constitution. As currently applied by the
Supreme Court, neutrality operates as a concept of convenience-lenient toward facially neutral laws having a racially disproportionate
impact and highly intolerant toward laws advantageous to racial minorities. The achievement of racial and gender equality and fairness
in the post-affirmative action era, as envisioned by the colorblind jurisprudence, is primarily dependent on vigorous and impartial enforcement of the anti-discrimination laws. The doctrinal ambiguity of
neutrality is, and will continue to be, a major impediment to effective
law enforcement.
The road to achieving doctrinal certainty depends on according
neutrality the meaning it naturally and intrinsically commands. The
Supreme Court can only provide this meaning by recognizing absolute
impartiality as the touchstone of neutrality and by establishing a
framework for verifying claims of impartiality. In terms of impartiality, the reformation of neutrality requires the Court to change the prevailing rule of facial neutrality. The current rule immunizes a facially
neutral law from judicial scrutiny, even when the law impacts disproportionately on racial minorities. At least from the perspective of the
affected minorities, the law is not impartial and, therefore, not neutral
- neutrality's self-certification of the law notwithstanding.
322. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Ansonia Boardof Education v. Philbrook,479
U.S. 60 (1986), which declared that public employers have no obligation to accommodate
religion at all costs was a harbinger of the Court's emerging Free Exercise Clause
jurisprudence.
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In the post-affirmative action era, racially disadvantaging laws
should be a matter of national concern. Not all racially disadvantag-

ing laws are discriminatory, nor do these laws invariably call for judicial relief. Disparate racial impact, however, should be a trigger for
judicial exploration of the reasons, and evaluation of the justifications,
for the law's deviation from impartiality. As Justice O'Connor ob-

served, "[t]here is nothing talismanic about neutral laws of general
applicability" because laws neutral toward religion or race can deprive

a person of his or her religious freedom or freedom from discrimination "just as effectively as laws aimed at religion [or racial groups]." 3"
Bestowing constitutional sanctity to the facial neutrality of a racially
disadvantaging law may be as incongruous as recognizing Switzerland's sale of arms on credit to Nazi Germany as an impeccable act of
324
neutrality.
If the Supreme Court is inclined to reform its neutrality jurisprudence, it needs to systematize its inquiry into claims of impartiality;
the inquiries are implicit in self-inscribed facial neutrality. The Court
could easily adopt the analytic framework that it has already developed in probing the impartiality of facially neutral laws in the context
of the Free Exercise Clause. Methodized analysis under this framework will reveal not only the substance of the claims of impartiality of
race disadvantaging facially neutral laws, but also the redeeming attributes that warrant judicial imprimatur of constitutionality. In the
process, the reviewing courts will be assuming more responsibility
than they currently do in assuring that laws are fair and equitable to
all races and segments of our pluralistic society. Until the Court institutes such a systematized scrutiny of the impartiality of race disadvantaging facially neutral laws, the Court's colorblind equal
protection jurisprudence will remain marred by suspicions of partiality
and racial insensitivity.

323. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 677 (1991) (citing Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 901 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment )). Justice O'Connor made
the observation in the context of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, but she
also made the inevitable comparison between religious freedom and freedom from race
discrimination in the same paragraph of her opinion.
324. See Dietrich Schindler, Neutrality and Morality: Developments in Switzerland and
in the International Community, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. RFv. 155, 160 (1998) (conference on
Neutrality and Holocaust) (stating that the Swiss action was incompatible with the law of
neutrality and that the Swiss practices of 1942 "primarily affected Jews and therefore
amounted to a measure of racial discrimination").
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